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Few topics in human societies are discussed with the same dread reserved for
indebtedness. The negative depiction of debt in a variety of human cultures and religions
is not surprising, indebtedness has been known to land people in prison, or worse,
slavery. That negative view of debt also appears in political discussions on the national
level, harrowing stories of financial collapse in the aftermath of debt crises are common
on every continent. Yet, sovereign debt crises keep happening and with an alarming
frequency as the growth of international financial markets and proliferation of new
financial instruments create a very precarious system. Access to cheap credit on the
international market created an economic culture of “rollover” that essentially allows a
continuous foreign debt burden provided it is “sustainable”. This “sustainability”,
however, is entirely conditional on the stability of the international financial market,
perhaps the most complex and tempestuous existing market. As an unforeseen market
crash, half a world away can suddenly make rollover impossible, and trigger an economic
crisis, there seems to be no sure way of eliminating the risk of sovereign debt crises. This
begs the question; given how recurrent sovereign debt crises have become in the past
decades1, is this a feature of the international financial system, or simply a bug in its
code? If debt crises are indeed a feature of the system and a tool to be wielded by certain
actors, why are they deployed? And how can they be countered? If they are a bug, why
do they keep happening? What is the problem that is not allowing actors to correct this

David Harvey, “Neo‐Liberalism as Creative Destruction,” Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human
Geography 88, no. 2 (2006): pp. 154.
1
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malfunction or guard against it? Is the root cause economic, ideological, or a mixture of
both?

Tackling such a question requires us to define some key aspects such as what
constitutes a sovereign debt crisis, what kind of debt is associated with these crises, and
what are the overarching structures within which debt crises occur?

Defining Parameters and theoretical framework
As high levels of debt to GDP are not the surest measure to determine if a crisis is
occurring or not, the simple criteria used here will be the inability to service external debt
and requesting debt restructuring to stave off default. For this study, the focus will be
placed on debt owed or guaranteed that is denominated in currencies not controlled by the
indebted polity. By default, this places our focus on economies in the periphery of global
capital accumulation as these are the economies whose dependence on international
reserve currencies can put them at this risk. By using this rather specific definition we
exclude domestic debt denominated in the national currency as the government can
amortize it quickly by deploying inflationary measures, thereby staving off default.
As to the system within which this indebtedness is happening, that is capitalism,
debts -and loans their natural inverse- are a necessary component of the system. They
allow for a hastening the value realization process, increase the velocity of money, and
generally allow for bypassing current resources bottlenecks if future returns are
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forecasted to cover the servicing costs2. That is economically, debts and loans are part
and parcel of the system. It is no coincidence that the etymological origin of capital is
capitale, Latin, for the principal of a loan3.
Having established the necessity of debt, it is no surprise that every school of
political and economic thought has tackled the issue of debt casting it in one light or the
other. The view of debt that is most in currency is perhaps the one illustrated by Michael
Todaro and Stephen Smith in Economic Development, a book4 used for many
introductory economics courses around the world. Todaro and Smith historicized
international debt crises as the results of global macroeconomic trends and access to easy
money. Their model pinpoints the origin of the international debt as the variation in the
valuation of different goods. As such while less developed countries produce and export
less-valued primary goods, they import more-valued secondary goods. This basic
imbalance in the valuation creates the gap that international debt tries to bridge. Added to
that dynamic is capital-rich nations’ desire and ability to export capital and developing
countries need to import that capital to develop their own resources. Their analysis of the
proliferation of debt crises in the later decades of the twentieth century is rather simple.
The recycling of commodity boom windfalls meant greater access to foreign loans for a
great majority of poor countries, prompting them to become less than cautious and accrue
debt from commercial banks rather than Bretton Woods institutions to avoid their
conditionality. Of course, this lack of conditionality came at the price of higher interest

Ramzī Zakī, Azmat Al-duyūn Al-khārijīyah: Ruʼyah Min Al-ʻālam Al-thālith (Crisis of External
Debt: A View from the Third World) (Cairo: al-Hayʼah al-Misṛīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb, 1978), 6972.
3
Graeber, David. Debt the First 5000 Years. (Brooklyn, New York: Melville House, 2014.) 453.
4
Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith. Economic Development (Harlow: Pearson, 2015.).
2
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rates that can easily become unserviceable in case of external shocks, triggering an
international debt crisis, and forcing these countries to resort to the Bretton Woods
system and the conditionalities that they avoided earlier5.
Todaro and Smith’s primary takeaway is that debt – both personal and
international - is the mechanism to ensure the realization of surplus value. However, their
focus on a balance sheet approach to international debt renders it devoid of any
meaningful nuance or critique of its mechanics. For example, as they explain the
financial cycle for commodities’ profits recycling as in the case of the petrodollars, this
cycle seems to always favor accumulation at the capital exporting countries. Since what
they lose in exchange for the commodities is then compensated for by the profits
deposited in their banks and the accrued interest and opportunities for further financial
investments. When this is added to the fact that these countries usually have the trade
balance to their favor to begin with and before the accrued benefits of their positions as
financial centers, it paints a picture of an unbeatable system where countries are locked in
their positions for the system’s duration. This deeply troubling and natural conclusion to
the cycle as explained by Todaro and Smith is never reached, as they shy away from
systemic condemnations and favor critiques of individual actors. Their analysis also does
not seem to be well positioned to explain or address some realities of the global economy
such as the high levels of debt incurred by capital surplus countries such as the United
States of America (U.S.A.) and Japan.
Paul Krugman’s analysis of the Asian financial crisis offered a similar view of
debt, that places the blame on individual actors, blaming the high levels of foreign debt
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accrued by the private sector while staying mostly uncritical of the system within which
these actors operate6. In 2015, after several debt crises later, Krugman inched ever-soslowly with the help of Gauti Eggertson to interrogate the system within which the hazard
of debt crises occurs. They present debt crises origins as sudden shocks to the market that
force actors to take drastic measures to deleverage quickly enough to adjust to the shock,
or face a sovereign debt crisis. This view still blames individual actors for their own
demise, but it recognizes the importance of the systemic shock in instigating the situation
and forcing the actors to make a certain set of choices7.
Analyzing the same financial crisis, Joseph Stiglitz went beyond Krugman’s
superficial analysis. For instance, Stiglitz notes the proliferation of debt crises from the
1970s onward which allows him to see the crisis as a part of a trend. This meant that
while Stiglitz pointed to government secured private debts as a hazard and high ratios of
short-term debt to foreign reserves as a good predictor of crises, he did not explain the
crisis away as individual failures8 of actors. Instead, he argues that the crisis is created by
the failure of theoretical models informing decision making to account for the full
complexity of the financial markets and the accompanying lack of regulation. This
argument is of course, bolstered by the fact that the trend acceleration starts in the late
1970s as financial deregulation gains momentum. Even though Stiglitz acknowledges
that the handling of such crises creates “winners and losers” depending on which course

Paul Krugman, “Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises,” International
Finance and Financial Crises 6 (1999): pp. 459-472.
7
Gauti B. Eggertsson and Paul Krugman, “Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A FisherMinsky-Koo Approach*,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, no. 3 (June 14, 2012): pp.
1469-1513.
8
Jason Furman et al., “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 1998, no. 2 (1998): pp. 2-51.
6
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of action is taken, he does not fully pursue that case9. His analysis is almost purposely
apolitical, as even as he addresses lack of financial regulation and theoretical frameworks
as important conditions for such crises, he does not address the ideology that informed
these theories or pursued the deregulation of the financial industry - that is neoliberalism.
The main issue with the aforementioned views is that they acquiesce to debt as a
fait accompli, they treat it as an almost apolitical economic tool, relegated to the domain
of economics and finance. This general disregard for the political aspect renders them
unable to problematize debt, or question its logic. The pure economic rationalization of
debt creates a disconnect between the logic of its accruing, which is economic, and the
reality of managing its crises, which is political. In fact, upon closer inspection we see
that external debt is nestled in two intersecting power asymmetries; the first is the
asymmetry between the polities themselves - debtor and creditor- and the positions they
occupy in the global division of labor, and the second asymmetry lies between the
different social classes within the same polity who have varying degrees of power and
differing views on the optimal outcome.
As such, it would only make sense to look at debt from a political economy lens,
such as that employed by the late Rosa Luxemburg. Luxemburg outlined the importance
of international debt for the creditor states as both an outlet for surplus capital that cannot
be effectively recycled within the system, and a way to ensure the realization of the value
produced in the debtor state. Luxemburg extends that, refusing to leave international debt
as a mere economic tool. She expounds “Foreign loans are indispensable… they are the
surest ties by which the old capitalist states maintain their influence, exercise financial
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control and exert pressure.”10. Luxemburg thus chooses to view debt as both political and
economic, and argues that both the creditor and debtor attempt to use debt to further their
own goals within the system. The creditor hopes to bind the indebted to themselves and
absorb the value chains embodied in the indebted, while the indebted attempts to bypass
primitive capital accumulation that is needed for the transformation of socio-economic
relations and mode of production. Although developed over a hundred years ago,
Luxemburg's conception of international debt is still valuable and surprisingly current.
Her model of the debt process also allows for objective fulfillment for both parties
engaged, but recognizes that this is usually not the case, and that whatever absolute
improvements occur in the indebted polity, it will remain relatively subservient to the
creditor polity. Luxemburg’s serious interrogation of debt as a political tool was
groundbreaking, thorough, and practically timeless. The problem with Luxemburg’s work
today is mainly that her structural approach can leave little room for agency, as the
process is presented as nearly automatic and the domination of the indebted seems
certain. This fatalistic view however is completely justified by her temporal surroundings
as the cases she drew on such as Khedivate of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire presented
results that supported her thesis. However, over a century of developments gives us
access to a variety of cases where the outcome was not a given. The general trend that
saw the emergence of liberal democracies as the dominant form of organization and
concessions on political freedoms and rights to organize meant that social factions could
articulate and pursue positions on issues that were previously deemed the prerogative of
the state or sovereign such as the national debt. This does not detract from her work
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which remains influential and informative until today but rather to say that a proper
examination of debt now necessitates a deeper acknowledgment and analysis of agents
and their choices out of the options offered within the system.
After Luxemburg’s thorough and extensive analysis, came Vladimir Lenin’s more
famous contribution in his book Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin’s
view was much simpler than Luxemburg’s. For him, international debt was extended by
the imperial centers to their “tributary” vassals as a means to financially institutionalize
their bondage. This imposition theory of debt privileges the creditor as the center of
analysis, Lenin views the process of financialization and extension of loans as an act of
capitalism in decay that resorts to the exportation of capital due to the high-profit margins
backed by gunboat diplomacy if default is on the horizon11. Lenin’s analysis is much
more blunt and superficial compared to Luxemburg’s, he does not engage with her work
at all, focusing much of his energy on his feud with Karl Kautsky. By failing to engage
with Rosa Luxemburg’s much more developed body of work, Lenin produced a much
less nuanced view of debt within imperialist structures. However, his position as the
founding father of the Soviet Union guaranteed his theory much more fame, even if its
actual contribution to the field was rather limited.
With a full century-worth of debt crises and analyses, Wolfgang Streeck
developed one of the most balanced models of indebtedness. Streeck problematizes debt
both politically and economically and offers a structural view that focuses more agency
on actors within the system. He agrees with Todaro and Smith on recognizing an
important role for the balance of payment problems as he explores the debt crises of the
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same period but posits that the real culprit is neoliberalism. Streeck’s analysis is
beautifully simple. As neoliberal reforms encouraged lower tax rates and financial
deregulation to incentivize investments, it simultaneously decreased the state’s ability to
generate revenues drastically while a liberalized financial system allowed them to cover
the deficit through easy credit. These mutually reinforcing axioms normally result in an
increase in the accepted sustained indebtedness and make the polity vulnerable to shocks
it otherwise would have cleared12. Streeck’s integration of mental conceptions and
ideologies and their ability shift economic orthodoxy and affect which of the actions
possible within the system can be taken by different actors allows for a merger of the
political and economic reasoning of both the accruing and the management of debt. Also
his focus on the relationship between taxation and indebtedness allows for an analysis
that centers class relations, as fiscal trends within a polity are indicative of the strengths
of the different classes and social formations, avoiding a monolithic view of the system
and allowing for deeper inspection. Streeck’s analysis takes this even further as he argues
that debtors become an exogenous constituency of the state whose needs and interests are
shielded from any sort of democratic demands leveled by the endogenous constituencies
such as the citizenry13. Streeck’s analysis remains one of the most thorough, coherent,
and logically consistent analyses of that crisis. For our analysis, Streeck’s focus on class
relations as metered by fiscal and debt policy can be extended to external debts too,
allowing us to transcend state relations and to use external debt to analyze direct

12

Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso
Books, 2014). Pp. 49-84.
13
For a full analysis of internal debt mechanisms and policies, see Wolfgang Streeck’s Buying
Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism.

13

interactions between different classes in different states through the medium of
international debt.

Politicizing debt:
So far, we have only explored the political as an auxiliary to the economic. But
before we can formalize the questions furthering this research, we need to ground our
questions in firm political theory, that is political in its own right, not by the extension of
economic argument. This is where the Neo-Gramscian school has a lot to offer. Antonio
Gramsci’s revolutionary work on Historic Blocs as a tool of understanding the
predilections of governing powers in different polities. These blocs form through
alliances between different socio-economic forces that together aspire for hegemony.
This conception of historic blocs allows us to see the state as a space of interaction and
struggle instead of a single-willed monolithic actor, which necessarily upends traditional
views of global politics. The second concept Gramsci has to offer is Hegemony that is
“The structure of values and understandings about the nature of the order that permeates
the whole system of states and non-state entities'', this hegemony can be enforced as
effectively by fanciful emulation, forceful coercion, or mere inaction. As such, hegemony
is the overarching structure, within which these historic blocs are nestled.

Neo-Gramscian scholars such as Robert W. Cox and Stephen Gill have done
much to alleviate any confusion or vagueness in the Italian revolutionary’s
conceptualization of hegemony and applied it on a global scale. World hegemony is thus
defined as “an outward expansion of the internal hegemony established by a dominant
social class. The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated
14

with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad.”14 This definition of
hegemony is important for three main reasons. First, it liberates itself and its subject of
study from the state-centricity of many of the aforementioned analyses, allowing it to
deal with socio-economic classes and transcend the veils of the state apparatus. It also
sheds the subject-object duality and distinction that shapes much of the conversations
about imperialism. Second, it escapes the barrenness of purely economic analysis into the
vista of comprehensive material analyses, which is examining not only the material
conditions such as economic institutions and natural resources, but also the social
institutions, cultural traditions, technological innovations and political arrangements that
such conditions produce. Third and most importantly, it does not get mired in defining
core and periphery distinctions, world systems, or even the difference between variations
of imperialism, but rather chooses to go for the essence of that, which is hegemony. Thus,
the Neo-Gramscian pursuit of hegemony is an attempt to create an understanding of the
essence not bounded by spatiality or temporality.
As to the content of this hegemony today, David Harvey argues that the
hegemonic ideological force of our time is neoliberalism. Having supplanted the social
democratic hegemony in western countries during the 1980s and introduced through
shock therapy to post communist countries during the 1990s, neoliberalism emerged as
the dominant hegemonic ideology. This view is not controversial in the least in the
general discourse, however, Harvey’s view of neoliberalism as a force of creative
destruction that aims to destroy old systems of socio-economic organization, purposely
paving the way for an upward redistribution of economic and class power is anathema to
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the neoliberal discourse.15 While neoliberalism has been marketed as the financial
rationalization of the economy and a common sense approach to monetary questions, any
implication that it is a conscious project with class power implications is soundly ignored.
This purposeful portrayal of an ideology as merely the rational ideologically disinterested
view is the mark of hegemonic ideologies. Ideologies that so thoroughly permeated
through the culture to the extent that they can be easily -and purposely- confused for
human nature. Harvey argues that the two main elements of neo-liberalization are
financialization and crisis manipulation. Financialization in this sense is the rising wave
of financial deregulation, speculation, and promotion of incurring higher debt levels.
Essentially, this meant making financial services the binding agent of the economic
system, and allowing financial capital to take the central role of directing the economy,
its surpluses, and in turn socio-economic life. Harvey also notes the same trend of
accelerating debt crises that Stiglitz noted and ties it firmly to the hegemonic rise of
neoliberalism. In this vein, Harvey views the rising debt levels and recurrent debt crises
as a neoliberal “trap”16, a tool that allows for redistribution of wealth masking
neoliberalism’s failure to generate the growth that it promised. It also justifies the
austerity measures and privatizations and the rewriting of the social contract in a way that
allows upward redistribution of wealth and power. Simply put, debt becomes a trap that
ensnares polities in a crisis, the solution to which favors the restoration of class power to
capital17.

Harvey, “Neo‐Liberalism as Creative Destruction” pp. 147-149.
Harvey, “Neo‐Liberalism as Creative Destruction” pp. 154.
17
Harvey, “Neo‐Liberalism as Creative Destruction” pp. 152-155.
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If we are to synthesize these views, debt ceases to be a mere tool for the
realization of value on the global stage. As hegemony extends itself, the periphery’s
fanciful emulation of the core’s culture necessitates raising loans to bridge the gap
between them. Thus debt not only can be a product of hegemonic relations, but it also
serves to reify it in terms of economic domination. This versatility is embodied in how
the hegemonic historic bloc can use debt to secure the servitude of marginalized classes
in different polities across the globe, institutionalize terms of exploitation and entrench
them in the socio-economic fabric of indebted polities. It also allows the hegemonic
powers to covertly interfere in the war of formation of national historic blocs by
supporting or opposing certain social factions so as to ensure that the emergent historic
bloc will be compatible with their own.

Purpose of Research and methodology:
With these essential parameters defined, we can move on further to exert the
question of whether these crises are a feature or a bug. This query can be pursued by
exploring the arguments supporting either answer and applying them to selected cases to
examine which bears truth. Due to the near impossibility of quantifying all instances of
debt crises in global politics and analyzing each on their own merit in this given space,
the research will follow an inductive approach. This will be done by surveying three
prominent case studies of debt that vary in the economic situation, material conditions,
ruling historic blocs, and lastly position within the global political-economic system. First
is the case of Greece whose current debt crisis became the poster child for great
recession-induced debt crises in Europe, it also presented a very dynamic political
situation in which debt and its implications remained at the crux of the political
17

discourse. The second case is that of Puerto Rico, one of the last colonies remaining on
the planet, the debt crisis of which revitalized independence discourse within the
Caribbean nation. Although ostensibly a part of the United States of America, the island
is in many ways “alien” to the mainland. The third and last case is Ecuador, the
Ecuadorian case is one of the most interesting as it saw multiple sovereign defaults,
dollarization of the economy, and a military coup. These three cases cover polities that
span disparate international configurations, varying economic conditions, and different
historic blocs since the neoliberal turn of the 1980s and the concomitant financialization
and prevalence of cheap credit.
These three cases present a fully independent state in Ecuador, a modern colony in
the Puerto Rican Case, and finally a polity within a supranational organization in Greece.
These varying cases are meant to reflect different degrees of agency for the local historic
blocs and their interactions with the hegemonic centers. This variation reflects in other
areas such as access to capital markets, the internal power dynamics within the polities
themselves, and extends more importantly to the structure of the economy and its
integration in the global economy. They also present differences in the mental
conceptions that permitted the incurrence of debt and how the different socio-political
forces related to their international creditors. Simply put, each one of these cases is
embedded into different economic, political, and social constellations, so that by
including them in this study to compare and contrast, the largest amount of variables and
differentiation in material conditions could be surveyed, the only constant being
international debt crises. Building on this inductive approach, the commonalities of these
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cases can be reasonably attributed to debt, allowing us to examine how much agency can
be curtailed by debt and if that curtailment is a bug or feature of the system

Proposed Crisis Model
Surveying these cases and others, we find that debt crises unfold in four main stages, we
detail them as follows:
1- Easy Credit: The polity incurs easy debt, through the cases I have observed that
the incurrence of debt happens during periods of low interest rates, which are
often presented as an opportunity. Not capitalizing on it would constitute lost
opportunities for growth, an anathema to governing economic mantras.
2- Market Shock: an adverse market development causes a constriction in the money
supply on the international market and raises interest rates, opening a chasm of
deficit that can quickly descend into a debt crisis. The speed by which the crisis
progresses is inversely proportional to the polity’s ability to close the gap, either
by drastic cuts to services or by generating new revenue.
3- Political Crisis: the progression of the economic crisis necessitates increased
politicization as various factions start vying for more power within the historic
bloc. While decisions are being made as to how the cost of the crisis will be
shared, various factions attempt to shield themselves from the fallout by
increasing mobilization.
4- Resolution: the turmoil either begets changes within the historic bloc that attempts
to form a new hegemony that reflects the new socio-economic reality, reflecting
which factions lost ground and which factions gained power, or the status quo is
allowed to continue if the economic crisis abates.
19

Ironically, in the aftermath of the crisis, the government usually makes a point of
its ability to secure loans for rollover. The impeccable logic of debt stands, while blame
is assigned politically, and punishment economically, although rarely to the same groups.
These bifurcated consequences almost nullify the need for reflection, especially if the
blame can be placed on mischievous and cruel gods of the market. This disconnect
between the economic logic of incurring debts mystified by equations and their
interpretations and the political rationality of managing their crises is nothing less than
the heart of the issue as it precludes any effective contingency planning and devoids the
process of any didactic potential. As such, it becomes our task to investigate what is the
cause of this bifurcation if it is to be treated.
The main limitation of the study is the cases’ concentration in what can be seen as
a more integrated near-periphery which might limit its application to Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) where capital formations might be less developed or coherent.
However, the burgeoning debt crises of the past couple of decades have been
concentrated in this near-periphery, partially thanks to some successes of the HIPC
initiative. Still, the study aims to curtail this limitation by focusing on the material
interests underpinning the aims and goals of different factions entering into the crisis.
This evasion of essentialist claims permits a more versatile model that allows a higher
degree of agency for actors, and hence expanded applicability beyond the specific class
formations and factions present in these cases. The main challenge to the conduct of the
study, however, is the relative dearth of scholarship in English on the Ecuadorian case,
and recent academic work on the still-unfolding Puerto Rican case. While these are
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certainly challenges to the research process itself, it is all the more reason to attempt to
add to the scholarship on these cases.

Proposed Hypothesis:
My argument is that debt crises create a situation whereby one faction or the other
has to bear the fallout. the three primary factions are either the working classes of the
indebted state who shoulder the cost as austerity, reduction in services, and higher
regressive taxation. The capital classes and the money managers of the indebted state
could shoulder the burden in the form of increased regulation of their activities, higher
corporate and capital gains tax, and a reduction in their autonomy through increased
government presence in the marketplace. Last but not least are the lenders, who could
shoulder the cost as a default on their loans, drastic haircuts to the debt value, and loss of
capital forwarded. Of course, these lenders nested in their own historic blocs can call on
their allies to fortify their position, as their losses can bleed into their own national
economy, and threaten their own internal hegemony.
As such there are three possible outcomes possible for alliances formed. As these
factions jockey for position in the conflict, each takes stock of its objective, and which of
the other factions can be accommodated while achieving that objective. For the working
class, that objective would be to avoid austerity and all that comes with it from cutting
social services, lower wages, and higher taxes. As this objective can only be served by
defaulting or debt haircuts, this puts them at diametric opposition to the lending
institutions, rendering an alliance highly unlikely. The other faction that can however be
accommodated and served by debt haircuts or even a default is the capital class. This
forms the national alliance, whereby the indebted historic bloc solidifies around its
21

leadership and demands that the lending institutions -international capital- bear their fair
share of the loss. The capital class can make the choice to ally with the lending
institutions instead. This forms the capital alliance, lending institutions and domestic
capital reinforce each other forcing the working class to bear the burden of failure in the
name of austerity while domestic capital only pays the meagerest of prices in the name of
economic orthodoxy. These alliances can form and reform more than once during a crisis.
As such the actor best able to make a choice in who to ally with is the capital
class. three elements have to be considered to predict the course of action taken by
capital. First, is the composition of the capital class itself. On one hand, Industrial capital
has a close working relationship with the working class which if well organized can
pressure industrial capital into a national alliance as through strikes and labor actions they
can halt the process of production and hold capital hostage. On the other hand if financial
capital and its rentier auxiliaries are the dominant factions within the class, the working
class has much less leverage, especially compared to lending institutions. Lending
institutions themselves being a central part of the architecture of global financial
capitalism means that not only do they operate within the same ideological conceptions
as local financial capital, but also means that they are integrated to a large degree.
Defaults can put severe stress on financial capital as it halts its ability to realize value in
the market.
The second element is the internal balance of power. That is, positions classes
occupy within the historic bloc; a sufficiently organized and powerful working class
could overwhelm capital democratically and make it an unwilling partner in the national
alliance. A disorganized working class could have trouble articulating itself beyond

22

demonstrations and sit-ins and can end up easily paying the full price of the crisis. This
ability of the working class to organize itself is perhaps the most important determinant
of the outcome of the crisis. At the beginning of the crisis, capital is fully aware of the
cost of antagonizing the lending institutions, that is the outcome of a national alliance and
subsequent default. As such in its starting position capital has an often quantified cost through projection models- of allying with the working class, and an ambiguous amount
of social unrest as the cost of the capital alliance. This implies that the default position of
capital is to seek a capital alliance. However, the more organized the working class, the
more unrest is possible. A sufficiently powerful working class can raise the cost of unrest
high enough that it surpasses the cost of projected losses. At such a point, the rational
choice for capital becomes the national alliance.
The third element to be considered would be the creditor’s ability to exact
punishment. The creditor could have a range of options at his disposal including financial
embargoes, seizure of assets, and even war. Although there is no shortage of wars to
force repayments in history, their incidence has dropped significantly, as within the
current global economy losing access to the global financial market is a much more
credible threat than war, and arguably more devastating.
As such, it is possible to hypothesize that maximum political autonomy will allow
for maximum maneuverability within the debt crisis. Following this path, it is expected
that the winner within the national arena gets to negotiate terms with creditors. An
industrial economy would probably be the best environment for the working class as it
allows it maximum leverage over capital through control over the process of value
realization. It is also to be expected that the strength of financial capital, that is its ability
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to realize value independent of the working class would make it least susceptible to
democratic coercion by the working class. The global financial architecture also allows
financial capital far more freedom to escape -coercion or austerity- through offshoring
and capital flight than industrial capital can muster at this point. Default also breaks
access to financial markets threatening to cut the umbilical cord connecting local and
international capital. As such it is to be expected that in polities where financial capital is
more dominant, the likelihood of defaults in the event of a debt crisis decreases. Thus, the
hypothesis is that the power of financial capital within the historic bloc is inversely
proportional to the probability of default as a chosen outcome to debt crises.
Industrial capital on the other hand might be more amenable to defaults depending
on how integrated it is in the global value chains. An industrial capital mostly oriented to
an internal market can withstand debt crises and default much easier than industrial
capital that relies on external markets for supplies. It also reasonably follows that sectors
that realize profits on the international market would be more amenable to default as it
allows them disproportionate gains during the crisis due to their access to their secured
access to hard currency. As such, it would be logical to conclude that agricultural capital
and labor would be more amenable to default than austerity. While the different forms
that manifest determine whether labor or lenders have to shoulder the cost, they do have
one thing in common. Domestic capital rarely has to pay a price for debt crises, even
though it reaps the lion’s share of rewards from their incurrence. To put it in behavioral
terms, an actor has no inclination to cease an action if there are no negative
consequences.
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II. Greece: A Modern Financial Tragedy

“Greece Gets Bailout, Vows to Spend It Unwisely”
25

Such was the endplate for a Saturday Night Live sketch from 2011. The sketch
depicted the Greek gods discussing the financial crisis and heaping blame on the Greeks
as lazy and unscrupulous people who need to be taught prudence and the value of savings
by the unwilling Klaus, the German god of finance. The gods of mount Olympus force
Klaus to accept the deal by threatening “we invented democracy, we can take it away”18
Although comedy shows are rarely good source material, they can be very
prescient in capturing and distilling the general discourse. Warnings that bailouts will
only lead to more profligacy abounded in the media.19 The general narrative of Greek
irresponsibility and laziness was displayed time and time again in attitude polls taken
during the crisis. Such allegations necessarily removed Greece from the temporal context
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the political context in which countries such as
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and even Italy were teetering on the edge. Members of the Greek
government have gone as far as describing the portrayal as a propaganda campaign, and
with good cause. Not only was the Greek debt crisis a function of the great recession, but
also a function of Greek history itself. Greece was born as a heavily indebted polity.
Greece suffered its first default before its independence was won.

A Hypoxic Birth
In 1824 and again in 1825 the revolutionary Provisional Administration of Greece
raised loans in the city of London to finance the war of independence. By 1826 the PAG
would default on the loans as the Egyptian expedition ravaged the Greek countryside and
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Greek fortune hit its nadir. It would not be until 1829 that the great powers would finally
agree to recognize the PAG as a sovereign state, and thus the Greek state would be born
with an umbilical debt around its neck. It is important to note, however, that the Greek
government did not squander the 2.8 million pounds sterling it borrowed, in reality, the
Greeks would only get less than half of the loans’ value, a mere 1.3 million GBP due to
obscenely high commission and issuance of less than 60 percent of par20. This economic
turmoil begat a tumultuous and unstable polity and between 1832 and 1833 the great
powers of Great Britain, France and Russia would convene again to solve the Greek crisis
and resolve on two measures, first, a German would be crowned king of Greece, an Otto
instead of a Klaus, and the Greek loans would be consolidated and guaranteed by the
great powers in return for Greece ceding legal control over its revenues to its now
creditors21 - the great powers. The independence won by eight years of Greek blood was
lost in four by the stroke of a pen.
Greece would refuse to negotiate with creditors until 1866 claiming it was not
responsible for a loan raised before its creation. While that might not be a strong
argument, one can easily see why Greece would not want to bear a debt that would
immediately put it at more than a 200% debt to GDP ratio. In 1878, Greece and the
creditors reached an agreement to repay 1.2 million GBP22, but after significant pressure
from the great powers - the guarantors- Greece relented and agreed to pay back the entire
nominal amount of the debt of 2.8 million GBP. Such incidents became common in the
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Greek state’s history as, by 2015, it had spent roughly 50% of its independent existence
in external default23.
Not only did Greece spend half its history effectively barred from the
international money market. It spent the first half of its existence in deficit despite
achieving primary surpluses that were immediately consumed by debt servicing.
According to Josefin Meyer, Carmen Reinhart, and Cristoph Trebesch, lenders would still
get returns of 1-5% on their investment, despite the recurring defaults due to partial debt
service during debt crises and the high yields demanded by the market for such risky
borrowers.24 Greece would suffer through enough defaults that there are legitimate
disagreements over how many default episodes there were, with estimates ranging from
five to seven depending on how strict or lax one’s interpretation of what constitutes a
default episode is. The most recent one of which, the July 2015 default, was the shortest
and perhaps most documented of Greece’s various defaults.

Easy Credit
As mentioned before Greece could not access financial markets for the majority
of its history as it was dogged by defaults and a highly unfavorable debt to GDP ratio.
This meant that successive Greek governments were particularly aware of their
precarious positions and diligently worked to pay down debts and avoid default crises;
difficulty in obtaining new loans meant that they were only solicited when absolutely
vital and prudent. This meant that Greece was not in too bad of a financial position in the
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run-up to World War II and the accompanying destruction, and although Greece would
suffer dearly, after the war it would massively benefit from the Marshall plan. Although
funds directed to Greece were less than expected for a country of its size and importance
in the emerging cold war, Greece made the most out of the funds available as it managed
to lower its debt stocks from more than 77% of GDP before the war to 23% in 195225.
For three decades Greece’s debt stocks would rarely cross 25% of GDP, as successive
governments were very cognizant of what it would mean for Greece to enter another debt
spiral. The free access to capital markets Greece earned in 1964 after renegotiating with
all debt holdouts was hardwon and the accession to the European Union in 1981 was the
crowning achievement of decades of shrewd fiscal management26.
Belonging to the European Union opened many doors for the Greek economy,
investments became easier to come by and an unprecedented level of access to money
markets saw Greece reap the fruits of years of wise stewardship as its access to capital
could now turbocharge its economy and make up for the lost time. Greece did indeed see
an astounding level of growth as its economy more than doubled between accession to
the EU and the introduction of the Euro in Greece in 200127. This astounding growth
however was fuelled by a borrowing spree as Greek debt levels rose from 26% in 1981 to
107% in 200128. Adoption of the Euro allowed the Greek economy to access capital
much easier as it grew by more than 160% between 2001 and 2008, the flipside of that
was that Greek debt stocks stayed abreast with GDP, as this sudden growth was almost

International Monetary Fund (IMF). “Greece: Debt % of GDP,” Historical Public Debt Database.
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/DEBT1@DEBT/GRC.
26
Reinhart and Trebesch, “The Pitfalls of External Dependence”. pp. 318
25

International Monetary Fund (IMF). “Greece: GDP, Current Prices” World Economic
Outlook. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/GRC.
27

28

(IMF). “Greece: Debt % of GDP,”.

29

entirely fueled by more than 200 billion Euros in Debt. The easy money access blinded
the Greek decision-makers as they either forgot what debt can do or chose to believe that
modern Greece, ensconced in the EU, one of the earliest acceders to the Euro was secure
enough.

Market Shock: Winds of Aeolus
In 2007, when rumbling in the financial market started, Greece’s debt to GDP lay
slightly over 103%, a worrying but manageable level. Not to mention Greece has not
suffered a debt crisis in more than 40 years, a record - albeit a sad one- in Greek history,
and more importantly one of Greece’s classical problems when it came to international
debt; the currency mismatch, was no longer a problem since Greece acceded to the Euro
in 2001. When Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis called for early elections in 2007, the
bulk of electoral campaigning focused on local forest fires and corruption claims29.
Karamanlis’ New Democracy won the election with the brewing financial crisis cresting
unnoticed in the background. In 2009 Karamanlis called for another early election, the
campaigning this time however centered on one thing only, the financial crisis. Rapidly
rising unemployment and debt quickly became the nexus of political campaigning and
street protests. Karamanlis would handily lose the election to George Papandreou’s
PASOK along with 20% of the Hellenic Parliament. Less than two months later,
Papandreou had to revise up the deficit for 2009 -which had already passed- from only
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5% to 12.7% as the previous government had attempted to hide the gravity of the
situation by cooking the books30.
Both Kostas and George were scions of established political dynasties from
opposing sides of the spectrum. Kostas traded on the Karamanlis name, and while his
uncle31 had the guile to trade some of his pseudo-fascist views for conservative ones as
he maneuvered Greece into the EU, Kostas was no such man. He was a traditional Greek
politician in post-apostasy politics. George’s family on the other hand had a more tragic
history. The first Papandreou, Georgios was a liberal anti-fascist whose first government
collapsed less than three months after the liberation of Athens in the prelude to the Greek
civil war. Almost twenty years later he would rise to the prime ministership again only to
be cast down in a royal coup and die under house arrest a few years later as his son was
exiled. Andreas, already seen as a radical before his exile, came back after the
dictatorship’s dissolution to form the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). A deft
politician and a gifted speaker, he rose to prominence quickly, first becoming prime
minister in 1981, an office he would hold for most of his remaining fifteen years.
Andreas remains a towering figure credited with helping Greece heal from the civil war
and juntas’ legacies32. Even in staying in the EU despite his opposition to it, he is credited
as seeking pragmatic means to achieve his ideological ends. His successors, however,
were far less impressive33.
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Papandreou the third immediately started exploring options for a bailout.
Skyrocketing debt to GDP ratio and expanding deficits were liable to rip through the
Greek economy and sink the Greek state into default again. Within a week of officially
requesting aid from the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), representatives of the IMF, European Central Bank (ECB), and European
Commission (EC) reached a bailout deal for the Greek state to the tune of 107.3 billion
Euros. The sheer swiftness with which the agreement was reached allayed fears of a
default for a while, the display of capitalist solidarity was assuring to the markets,
especially since all parties to the agreement achieved their goals.
While PASOK was ostensibly a socialist party, much like the rest of its
counterparts it had morphed into a neoliberal party during the age of the Washington
consensus. Any pretensions otherwise were laid bare by the bailout which saw the
working masses overwhelmingly bear the price of the bailout. Later revelations from the
meeting minutes revealed that the Greek government did not even seek a haircut to the
debt, probably in an attempt to preserve Greece’s still-fragile financial reputation while
also calming the markets. The minutes also revealed the disparity between the
representatives of trade unions, syndicates, and NGOs who were very critical of the
bailout program, and Greek business interests that were excited, and saw the bailout as a
chance to advance its own agenda curtailing rights and privileges in the labor market.34
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The first party to this bailout is the IMF, which achieved its fundamental goal of
preserving financial stability -or what was left of it- and prevented a Greek default and
the possible contagions it would have triggered for the price of 30 billion Euros. The EU
organs, although representing the varied and different interests of the composing
countries, were unified in their goal to avert a Greek default, each for their own reasons.
Peripheral countries such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were seriously worried
about a domino effect from a possible Greek default as the increased uncertainty and
interest rates would disallow them from continuing to rollover their debts, creating
liquidity cliffs for them to fall over. On the other hand, more powerful economies were
heavily concerned about the health of their banks. These banks' very low exposure rates in some cases as low as 3%- meant that they might not survive a Greek default, and
definitely could not survive its aftershocks in the European periphery35. As such
representatives of states such as Germany and France effectively bailed out their banks
by way of Greece. In addition to this, real fears percolated in EU halls of power that
Greece crashing out of the Euro could be the death knell for the young currency and the
project it reified36.
As for Greece itself, Papandreou exhausted PASOK’s political capital passing the
bailout and the attendant austerity measures. While the bailout saved Greece’s banking
system and the Greek state from insolvency, the accompanying austerity measures
wrecked the working class resulting in rapidly increasing poverty and soaring
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unemployment. This was the price Papandreou accepted in exchange for the state’s
solvency and the hard-won access to capital markets that the Eurozone granted. Given the
briefness of Greece’s unhindered access to capital markets and the momentous effort it
took to achieve it, Papandreou’s motives are fully understandable. Crashing out of the
Eurozone was a terrifying prospect, Greece would not only lose access to valuable money
markets in the Eurozone amid the debt crisis, but it would also lose its currency with all
the social, political, institutional, and economic costs of such a rushed monumental
transition. All of these attendant costs to Grexit meant that it could not be rationally
considered as a first or even a second option, the mere fact that Grexit went from an
unthinkable option to a preferred outcome for the majority of Greeks37 in a few years is a
testament to the cruelty of the bailout. However, Papandreou’s mistake was identifying
the locus of the problem in access to capital markets and not the debt that prevented it in
the first place.
As such the speed with which the bailout came together was simply because all in
attendance were in agreement that the Greek working class would foot the bill and since
they did not have any real champions in attendance, a consensus was reached quickly.
The price the Greek people had to pay came in the form of grinding austerity; firesale
privatization of state assets, mass layoffs, weakening labor protections, increased taxes,
and cuts in services and social protections. All of these measures were to achieve high
primary surpluses in the budget and allow the Greek state to decrease its debt load very
gradually without affecting any haircuts to the borrowers.
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The failure of the measures taken in May 2010 became evident so quickly that in
a little over a year discussions about a second bailout started. The results were
unequivocally a disaster for Greece. By 2012 unemployment had doubled, poverty grew,
and as a result, a recession set in. Greece would shed more than a sixth of its GDP within
the same period, sending its debt to GDP ratio to new heights, again finding its access to
money markets throttled. The fact that a second bailout would be needed, makes the
failure of the first unequivocal. It has even been argued that the first bailout is what
necessitated the second as it did not offer sufficient debt relief and saddled Greece with
impossible expectations due to significantly underestimating the recessionary effects of
the austerity inscribed within it.38
Before a second bailout could be agreed and having narrowly survived a noconfidence vote in the parliament, Papandreou announced he would seek a referendum on
the new bailout as his mandate was nearly non-existent. After pressure from Greece’s
international partners, namely France and Germany, Papandreou withdrew the idea and
chose to step down as prime minister instead, to be replaced by Lucas Papademos - a
banker- to head a new technocratic coalition government. The second bailout would see a
new round of austerity, high primary surpluses, weaker labor protections, lower minimum
wage, and budget cuts. On the other side, the creditors also bore a part of the burden
accepting a lower interest rate -3.5%- in addition to a 50% haircut to private creditors that
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amounted to nearly 100 billion Euros.39 The measures aimed to bring the Debt to GDP
ratio down to allow Greece access to the money markets on its own merit again40.
Although a haircut amounting to a quarter of the debt is not small, and probably
might have saved Greece in 2010, by 2012 it had virtually no effect on the
macroeconomic conditions of the country. The ongoing recession that was fueled in no
small part by the austerity measures was made worse -not better- after the 2012 round of
austerity as the economy continued to shrink in 2012 and unemployment continued its
inexorable march upward. The Papademos government would call for a new election
after the implementation of the deal. Papademos himself became a disposable executor of
the will of the Troika as any career politician or public servant saw the bailout as career
poison.
In May 2012 a new election was held that saw PASOK lose three-quarters of its
parliament seats, with New Democracy winning a plurality but unable to form a
governing coalition. The rise of the fortunes of parties running on anti-austerity is best
exemplified by SYRIZA, a coalition of leftist anti-austerity parties that would fuse into a
single party to contest the upcoming June elections. The June elections would see all
parties lose seats except for New Democracy led by Antonio Samaras, and Syriza led by
Alexis Tsipras who widened their leads. Samaras then formed a coalition government
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inviting all parties - except for the neo nazi Golden Dawn- to participate; three of the five
parties invited refused to join a government that committed to the bailout41.
Despite dodging the poison pill that was the second bailout, Samaras’ government
did not benefit from any public goodwill. Samaras hoped to capitalize on his absence
from the governments that signed the bailouts and draw a distinction between his
government and the previous ones. The public, however, seemed to see Samaras as a
continuation. Opposition to the Troika program continued unabated, protest movements
spread far and wide with anti-austerity protests becoming a staple of syntagma square.
The distrust between the people and the government had grown to the point of
widespread calls to stop paying taxes at all, in effect attempting a public default42.
While “We Won’t Pay” was motivated by the masses’ inability to pay these taxes,
the rich sheltered their assets in tax havens. In 2015 a study estimated that Greece could
raise 1.2 billion Euros annually in addition to 16 billion Euros in arrears and back-taxes
from assets stored in tax shelters. While this would not immediately solve the crisis it
would have definitely alleviated some of the pressure, and perhaps staved off the worst of
the worst of austerity. Instead, Samaras pursued a policy of tax cuts that reduced taxes on
dividends and estates by half, offsetting the lost revenue by increases in taxes such as the
Value Added Tax (VAT) which had increased from 19 to 23% in 201043. However, the
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recessionary spiral reinforced by austerity meant that even though the VAT increased, the
total VAT revenue collected decreased between 2010 and 2015 by roughly 20%44.
As the recession shrank tax receipts, and the Greek government was forced to
achieve primary surpluses, self-reinforcing stringent austerity measures were introduced
regularly with each round of austerity ritually followed by protests and strikes, and
governmental bans on protests and strikes45. In November 2013, -seemingly bowing to
public pressure- Samaras put forward a budget that did not include wage cuts and tax
hikes requested by the Troika46. However, he quickly backed down and passed even more
cuts that saw government spending drop by more than 17% in between 2013 and 201447.
Despite some signs of recovery in 2014, such as a slight improvement in the
unemployment rate, it did not turn out to be the bottleneck it was purported to be. The
IMF’s forecasts in June revealed that the Greek government would face a financing gap
of over 5 billion euros in 2014 and more than 12 billion in 2015, not only did that signal
the failure of the two previous bailouts, it also indicated that a third bailout will be
necessary48.
2014 was supposed to be the corner to be rounded, after the last disbursements of
the second bailout and the accompanying rounds of austerity, Greece was supposed to be
able to stand on its two feet and be done with bailouts and austerity. The announcement
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that there is a financing gap poured gasoline on the already inflamed social and political
situation in Greece, and the news of a possible third bailout ensconced debt and how to
manage it in the center of the national discourse. As the austerity measures whittled down
Samaras’ governing majority to a bare minimum, the governing coalition realized that
they had neither the mandate nor the votes to pass the new bailout program; this
necessitated a new election. Striving not to spook the markets, Samaras decided that
instead of calling for a snap election, he would bring up the presidential elections49.
Elections that he knew could not be won; a failure that would trigger a dissolution of the
parliament and new elections, thus the elections could be justified by the presidential
election instead of the impending third bailout50.
Not only did Samaras understand that he was certain to lose the election - New
Democracy trailed Syriza since late 2013 in opinion polls-, he understandably wanted to
lose the election. He has avoided putting his name to the 2012 bailout and he had no
desire to be responsible for the 2015 bailout, even though he implemented the first and
supported the second. As such when the election was held on January 25th, 2015, the
victory of Syriza was not surprising, and its electoral promises against austerity and
bailouts marked the first time since 2010 that Greece was intending to face down its
debtors for a better deal and the rise of a new historic bloc.
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Political Crisis: A Melian Dialogue
The Melians
When the Syriza Government headed by Alexis Tspiras was formed in 2015, by
all accounts they were in an unenviable position. Greece had lost a full quarter of its
national income since 201051, debt servicing accounted for 45% of all government
expenditure52, even with such a high debt servicing cost, the state still faced a financing
gap of over 12 billion euros. Out of 15.19 billion euros needed for the 21 debt repayment
tranches in 2015, the government could only muster little more than 3 billion, enough to
cover the first six tranches53. By June, however, the government would be insolvent. This
simple fact meant that by June Syriza had to make a choice.
Syriza had to choose one of three options. The first was a third bailout and
continuing the vicious cycle that ruined Greece for the past five years, it was in
opposition to this option that Syriza ran and won. The second was to renegotiate the
second bailout, haircut the debt, and/or restructure its payment to allow for lower primary
surpluses so the government can attempt to resuscitate the economy and end austerity.
This was the plan that Syriza proclaimed and by all accounts its preferred outcome. The
third option was default. If no renegotiation was to be had, payments would stop, and
shortly after Greece would crash out of the Eurozone. For Syriza, this was the nuclear
option, by no means their preferred course of action, but still preferred to a third
disastrous bailout. These were at least the stated preferences of the party. The nature of
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the party that originated as a coalition and came to bring together KKE veterans along
with PASOK apparatchiks, union organizers, and left-wing economists was mostly
coherent but never cohesive. Although often framed in the press as a rabidly left-wing
party, Syriza had its share of factions ranging from the moderate social democrats to
more radical socialists, and plenty in between. Although these factions represented real
divisions within Greek society and the body politic and as such their differences defy any
attempt to enumerate their various positions, in 2015 and for our study, only their
position on these three options mattered.
The first preference; renegotiation was favored by all, the difference, however,
was in ordering the second and third preferences, for the moderates, a bailout was
preferable to the nuclear option. For the radicals, crashing out of the Euro was preferable
to extending the humanitarian crisis that has unfolded.
Renegotiation fundamentally hinged on the proposals put forward by the minister
of finance Yannis Varoufakis; although in the radical camp, his proposals were very
modest and mainly focused on restructuring the debt in a way that allows Greece to
decrease the primary surplus from 4% to 1% of GDP and hence ease off the austerity and
allow the government to revitalize the economy through more public spending. The
objective was to reduce the debt service by spreading out the amortization of bonds, his
proposal focused on dividing the debt into different segments each to be structured
through bond swaps either to perpetual bonds, or GDP indexed bonds depending on the
legal framework through which they were issued54. This was done to avoid any legal -or
electoral- troubles for the lenders in an attempt to lessen the political cost for
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renegotiation on their part. This was particularly signified by the absence of haircuts in
his purported plan, as lowering the amortization rate would in effect be a haircut without
any of the accompanying political cost. The philosophy of the renegotiation would be to
create a mutually beneficial agreement that would see the lenders have their dues fulfilled
-although a bit later- through lessening the burden on the Greek people and allowing
them to prosper. However, his most controversial proposal was the uncoupling of Greek
banks from the Greek state. This would release the Greek state from its bank liabilities by
allowing the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to receive shares in the banks
instead of bonds55. This would turn the bailout into a buyout and stimulate the Greek
banking sector. However, this in effect would have meant the liquidation of the Greek
banking class56 and its attendant factions in the media and other industries. This proposal
however does not seem to have been bandied about in the campaign as it was mainly
expressed in the non-paper passed to negotiators and officials, possibly due to
Varoufakis’ estimation that the measure will not only be opposed by bankers but also by
some old school socialists as they would rather see the banks nationalized instead of sold
off to foreigners. An argument he rebutted by pointing out that the state has nothing to
gain from such nationalization, instead he believed the formation of a new state bank free
of all these liabilities would see the fears of his party compatriots allayed.
Out of these three paths default was the most perilous, as default in the Greek case
not only meant losing access to capital markets, it also meant losing its currency. A
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default meant that the ECB would immediately stop accepting Greek bonds and
subsequently the Greeks could no longer access Euros. In the annals of debt crises, this
would have been a first. Central banks are usually one of the few institutions that lend
insolvent governments as lenders of last resort. However, the ECB’s responsibility is to
the European Commission, not the Greek government and as such according to its
governing code, it could not accept bonds from an insolvent state. As such the Greek
government would have to introduce a new currency in the wake of the default if they did
not wish to turn to barter. On the other hand, a default could allow the government to
pursue restructuring plans and haircuts as it would have nothing more to lose; a new
currency reflecting the state of the Greek economy instead of the entire Eurozone would
eliminate price distortions and encourage exports. So, while the default path would be
perilous it was not without its positives. However, the fact that it would cost Greece the
Euro and all its attendant privileges meant that Greek capitalists and bankers were
ferociously against it.
Within this national alliance, the factional divide between the radicals and the
moderates in ordering their preferences reflected the preferences of the broad workingclass coalition represented by the first, and the party apparatchiks and bankers
represented by the second. With this came the understanding that comes June 5th, if no
agreement was reached each faction would have to coerce the other to accede to their
preferred option. This meant that not only could international capital reified in the lenders
play a battle of attrition against the national alliance until June 5th, but it could also
exploit the factional divide within the governing bloc.
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The Athenians
On the other side stood the Troika; the IMF, the ECB, and the EC representing the
various European states. Although infamous for its reputation of austerity, the IMF was
far from the lead villain in the Greek tragedy. Despite designing the first bailout and
signing on the second, the IMF started to become deeply skeptical of the Greek
program’s chances for success since 201157, this change of tone reflected the views of the
IMF’s new management under Christine Lagarde58; she was far less hawkish on austerity
than her predecessor and garnered goodwill with the Greeks on account of the Lagarde
list59. While not an erstwhile ally of Greek labor, her presence was small comfort for the
new occupants of Maximos that they would have at least one sympathetic ear. It is also
possible that the IMF only seemed sympathetic due to its placement as the second fiddle
to the ECB, after all the IMF had to negotiate with the ECB and the EC before it even
negotiated with Greece60. The fact that the ECB and EC provided the majority of the
funds meant that the IMF had to concede to their targets, something the IMF openly
criticized in its assessment of the 2010 bailout. The IMF outright felt sidelined arguing
that the ECB took charge of bank supervision despite having less expertise just by virtue
of their financial contribution while the EC focused on compliance with EU norms more
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than growth impact61. The strong words - and they were only words- that the IMF had for
the ECB, and the fact that it squarely laid the blame at the EC and ECB’s feet made the
Greeks hopeful that the IMF would not make the same mistake for the third time.
The ECB’s overriding motive was to maintain the Euro at any cost and perceived
a Grexit from the Eurozone to be an existential threat to the Euro. This fanatic
commitment to the institution of the Euro also meant it was the most rigid when it came
to any renegotiation as concerns about jeopardizing the principles of the monetary union
agreement tied their hands62. As such, Mario Draghi’s insistence that any debt relief or
restructuring be completely voluntary was not surprising, even if it was an invitation for
investment bankers to manipulate credit default swaps63. The fact that the ECB controlled
Greece’s monetary supply meant the ECB stood as the primary bulwark against any
Greek challenges and could retaliate immediately when needed. The single weakness in
the ECB’s defenses was the Securities Market Program (SMP)64 bonds, 6.6 billion euros
worth of these bonds were due in 2015, and any unilateral cut to them would open the
ECB and Draghi to legal and political challenges65. A unilateral haircut would have put
leaders in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and especially in the European Commission
in the crosshairs as it called their own judgment into question.
The European Commission was the only overtly political institution in the Troika.
As the executive organ of the labyrinthine EU it is heavily hampered by an impossibly
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complex system of official bodies such as the Economic and Financial Affairs Council
(ECOFIN) and the European Commission, and unofficial bodies such as the Eurogroup.
This allows for differences of opinion not only to materialize on the national level
between different member states but also within these states’ levels of representation
within the EU bodies. The wide diffusion in responsibility that this system permits
however is not matched by an equally diffuse power structure. The relationship between
the Eurogroup and the ECOFIN is an example of an inverted relationship between power
and responsibility. The Eurogroup, an informal grouping lacking any official mandate or
governing code enjoys the opacity it is afforded as it effectively has to pre-approve any
measure if it is to pass in the officially sanctioned and legally binding sessions of
ECOFIN. This murkiness made the movements of various European actors quite difficult
to ascertain; it also allows for plausible deniability, strategic ambiguity, and contradictory
messaging. The perks allowed by such complication and opaqueness make it difficult to
plausibly claim that it is accidental to the system and not a part of the design.
Broadly speaking, the Troika’s preferred choice was a third bailout building on
the second bailout and preserving the memorandum of understanding (MOU)
undergirding it; as this would keep the Euro and the EU intact while preserving the
reputation and political capital of the leaders of debtors bloc. However, much like the
Greek national alliance, in the debtors’ alliance too differences over which option
occupies second preference were the main crack in the alliance. Within the IMF for
example, Lagarde and her director of the European department Poul Thomsen seemed to
repeatedly contradict and disagree with each other, as Lagarde seemed to prefer
renegotiation even over a third bailout sometimes while Thomsen repeatedly refused
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renegotiation and insisted that the MOU remains untouched66. Diverging views on the
Greek debt crisis were particularly pronounced in the cases of Germany and France.
Germany, the indisputable economic hegemon of the Eurozone and the leading power in
the EU found itself at cross purposes as one direction was to preserve the Euro as a
political project, through a third bailout or even renegotiation; this seemed to be the
direction in which chancellor Angel Merkel headed. On the other hand, the German
minister of finance Wolfgang Schäuble was more concerned about the financial
soundness of the Euro as an economic project67. Schäuble was sternly opposed to
renegotiation and at one point suggested that he is amenable to a Greek time-out. This
timeout would see Greece crash out of the Eurozone, readjust independently, and after a
rapid recovery return to the EU on a sound footing68.
Within the EU machinery, Greece hoped to find allies in the other indebted
European periphery countries such as Ireland, Spain, and Portugal; as leniency for Greece
could surely benefit them too. It also hoped to make a common cause with France and
Italy as both nations feared they cannot afford the social and political costs of further
austerity, as such they too stood to benefit from a Greek renegotiation69. This support was
demonstrated more than once, but it was not strong enough to withstand any German
criticism. Thus, it is important to note that while the besiegers preferred a third bailout,
and the defenders preferred a renegotiation, default was no one’s preferred outcome.
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The Skirmish
When the insurgent Syriza seemed destined to win in the 2015 election, the
Samaras government started warning that a Syriza victory would trigger bank closures.
The fact that these closures would happen even if New Democracy won was immaterial
since there was no way New Democracy would win. After all, shifting blame is a timehonored democratic tradition, and in a purely pragmatic sense, it was the right thing to do
for Samaras. The fact that their rhetoric could trigger a bank run might still be explained
away as an undesired consequence. Less than a month before the election, however, the
recently appointed governor of the Bank of Greece Yannis Stournaras gave a foreboding
speech in which he spoke of rapid depletion of liquidity in the markets and irreparable
damage to the Greek economy due to the political crisis.70 The Bank of Greece is not
supposed to be a political actor, and more importantly it is supposed to stabilize the
markets, not spark a bank run. Syriza’s leadership understood well that they will not have
much time as the Greek bailout program ends on February 28th, only a month after their
election. The coffers will be empty by June 5th if no new agreement is reached. Tsipras,
the new prime minister chose to form his government in coalition with the right-wing
conservative Independent Greeks (ANEL). The controversial choice seen as an unholy
alliance was meant to create an image of Greece united despite ideological differences.
The government then sallied forth as time was of the essence.
This sally came in the form of a charm offensive that saw Tsipras and Varoufakis
tour European capitals drumming up support and allaying fears. Tsipras would attempt to
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rally political support while Varoufakis would present his plans to fellow ministers of
finance and economic functionaries to raise support among the technocratic financiers.
The latter’s plan to avert a third bailout rested on the achievement of four main
objectives. The first objective was to agree to a debt swap whereby bonds could be
swapped for perpetual bonds or GDP-indexed bonds whichever is legally and politically
feasible in each case. Alleviating the burden of debt amortization on the Greek budget
would have not only closed the financing gap, but it would have also ensured that Greek
debt would be sustainable71. The second objective was to amend the MoU in such a way
that the onerous 4.5% primary surplus would be replaced with a more realistic and
bearable 1.5%. This would alleviate the humanitarian crisis that has unfolded in Greece
as it would allow the government to increase public services. The increase in government
spending also served as a Keynesian counter-cyclical infusion to reinvigorate the
economy.72 The third objective was tax reform. The plan called for lower corporate
income tax rates, lower value-added taxes, to revitalize the private sector73, as well as
battling tax evasion through a new digitized system with high penalties, a period of
amnesty, and an agreement with the Swiss government to facilitate applying the new
system to Greek assets stashed away at Switzerland74. The object of these reforms was to
make the tax pool shallower and wider, to mitigate the recessionary-deflationary spiral
without reducing the government’s revenues. Lastly, the fourth and perhaps most divisive
of these objectives was to decouple the Greek state from the Greek banks. The logic was
simple: the banks were a liability and since the Greek state was functionally insolvent,
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reducing liabilities is the prudent thing to do. This would have been done by allowing the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to buy out the banks instead of bailing them
out75. Although economically sound, offering to sell out the Greek banks was highly
unorthodox, and perhaps fatal to a national alliance.
Only nine days after the new government was inaugurated and in the middle of
their goodwill tour, the ECB sucked the wind out of their sails. On February 4th, the ECB
removed the waiver that allowed the ECB to accept Greece’s junk-rated bonds as
collateral76. The announcement came shortly after a meeting between Varoufakis and
Draghi that focused on opening negotiations to review the Greek debt. This first salvo
effectively put the Greek financial system under siege as Greece’s own central bank -a
subsidiary of the ECB- could no longer supply it with the liquidity needed. Instead of
Greece going bankrupt on June 5th, its banks would be shuttered by February 28th. With
the Greeks now on their back heel, they would not truly regain the initiative for the length
of the crisis.
While repealing the waiver before its deadline on the 28th was a declaration of
war, even the most ardent supporters of Grexit agreed that this was not the time for it,
even if Greece now had a justification to default. This was due to two factors. The
ideological factor was that Greece could not be seen to be thrown out of the EU and had
to exit on its own terms. This was important for Greece’s national image but more
importantly to its position in the global market. The second and more important factor
was the economic and administrative one. Immediately on taking office Varoufakis set up
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a team to implement a digital parallel payments system that uses the newly digitized tax
database as a core for a national payment system. Such a system could stave off societal
breakdown in the event of a forced Grexit and eventually would serve as the basis for the
new currency77. As it was not ready yet, it would be incumbent upon the Greeks to get
back in the good graces of the ECB even if they planned to sever their connection to it
later.
Due to the intentionally arcane and purposefully subtle architecture of the
financial markets and the EU, the only realistic way to reinstate the waiver would be to
reach an agreement in the form of a vague communique through the Eurogroup. The
communique is the only formal product of Eurogroup meetings. Their sparse wording,
obliqueness, and austerity in details were almost designed for the understanding of
financial experts and no one else. Since the Eurogroup was also the seat of Eurozone
finance ministers it is where the political will of the Euro countries translates into the
economic politics of the Eurozone. This is why the Greek government decided that the
Eurogroup was to be the battleground for renegotiation.
The February 4th recension was needlessly aggressive and cruel, this was plain to
see. However, the backlash was not foreseen. While many states were relatively
comfortable watching the Greek tragedy, the unnecessary choking of the dying economy
was worse than a crime, it was a mistake. Germany maintained two parallel lines of
communication, the first between Merkel and Tsipras, and the second between
Varoufakis and Schäuble, and given Schäuble’s reputation as a disciplinarian, it is not
difficult to guess which was the good cop and which was the bad cop. While Schäuble
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rebuffed Varoufakis, Merkel seemed to be much more sympathetic78. The United State of
America (USA) support, although purely rhetorical, was seen as a gentle reminder for
Germany that it got carried away. In addition, Lagarde and Thomsen were becoming
more and more amenable to the Greeks as Draghi’s move could not be explained away by
anything but malicious intent79.
Occupied with the Ukrainian crisis, with pressure mounting Merkel decided to
overrule Schäuble and instructed that an agreement be reached. The first skirmish would
end on February 20th after only 16 days80. The main points of the communique were
establishing an extension to the Greek program for four months allowing for
renegotiation and committing Greece to an appropriate primary surplus -read 1.5%-. In
exchange, Greece agreed to commit to honoring its debt and expressed its commitment to
economic reform81. By holding out and standing fast the Greeks managed to secure one
of their long term objectives and bought enough time to achieve the rest.

Resolution: The Siege
Perhaps due to the entropy of victory or simply because of the haphazard manner
in which the governing bloc was assembled, the national alliance was beginning to
unravel even before the Greeks were done celebrating their victory. Factional divides
between the moderates and the radicals were flaring up, especially after it was revealed
that the chairman of the Greek council of economic advisors George Chouliarakis a close
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ally of deputy prime minister Yannis Dragasakis was working with the Troika behind the
negotiating team’s back82. Dragasakis, an economist by training and a party apparatchik
with close ties to banks and business leaders was a leader of the moderates83, and the fact
that one of his appointees was working with the enemy elevated factional disagreements
to suspicions of treachery.
Only a day after the victory of February 20th, Dragasakis and Chouliarakis
neglected to pass on a letter from the president of the working group of the Eurogroup
Thomas Weiser regarding the process and deadline of amending the extension of the loan
agreement. The minister of finance would only know about the letter after the deadline
had passed, disallowing Greece from capitalizing on the February 20th breakthrough or
wringing any more victories. As such by the time the month came to a close, the Greek
government was effectively divided against itself.84
The attempt to bypass Greek capital -represented by the banks’ liquidation
proposal - as the middleman and forming an unholy alliance between Greek labor and
European capital was rightfully seen as an existential threat by Greek capital. As such
while Greek capital was on board for renegotiations as they normally would not hurt it,
decoupling the banks meant that instead of renegotiations being the second preferable
option, it plummeted to last preference as even a default would see Greek capital survive
in some measure no matter how bloodied. This calculation ushered in the about-face by
the moderate wing as they proceeded to sabotage the renegotiation process. This is not to
say that by exploring an alliance with European capital, Greek labor was unique in its
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lack of confidence in the national alliance. Even before Syriza’s coalition government
came to power, status quo failsafes -such as Stournaras- had already been placed to
secure a favorable conclusion to Greek capital in case the national alliance fails. As for
Greek labor and its erstwhile representatives in the left platform to emerge on the
winning side, not only would it have to overtake the moderates within the party’s
government, they would also have to overcome the failsafe guardians of the status quo. In
addition to this factional strife and in contrast with the Troika side of the equation, the
Greek side did not have any measure of factional discipline that could keep the coalition
from fracturing and in fact from here on onward was openly undermined by infighting.
The victory of Greek capital and its ability to impose its will on the historic bloc
was not a foregone conclusion, in fact, it seemed unlikely just weeks prior. Three
identifiable factors pushed it to that victory. First, the firm grip capital had on Greek
institutions gave it a home turf advantage as the left faction was forced to work with the
institutions and people that Greek capital created and empowered. Stournaras’ presence at
the helm of the Bank of Greece is a great exemplifier of that grip. The fact that Yaannis
Roubatis, the head of Greek Intelligence could easily sow disinformation between the
radicals proved very detrimental to cohesion and led to an outright fracture in the radical
wing as everyone believed the others compromised85. The second factor is the material
fact that the hundreds of billions of Euros that poured into the Greek economy in the
previous decades filtered through Greek capital, which allowed it to build strong and
lasting patronage networks in the media, professional class, intelligentsia, and political
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parties. This control over the distribution of financial resources allowed Greek capital to
have a significant advantage in manufacturing consent, at least among the bureaucrats
filling the various seats of lesser power. The third factor was that a capital alliance
between European capital and Greek capital would always be more preferable to an
unholy alliance between European capital and Greek labor for ideological and practical
considerations. It would not require there to be an admission of guilt, ideological
realignment, or any course change, the capital alliance was already the status quo and the
sheer force of inertia was on its side.
During March, the discord grew as the stress mounted and trust practically
vanished86 . As the cohesion of the government itself dissipated, the political will and
capital necessary for Greece to maintain a deterrent stance vanished. Tsipras and
Varoufakis started attempting to solicit help from Russia and the People’s Republic of
China. They attempted to levy their competition with Germany and political-economic
interests in the region in hope that they will buy Greek bonds in a volume sufficient
enough to keep his government solvent through April87. No help was coming forth,
Russia was bloodied by economic sanctions and China could not risk angering European
partners over a matter so trivial to their national interest.
According to Varoufakis, on April 5th he was sent to default to the IMF before
learning mid-air that his comrades back home had decided that it was to be an empty
threat88. Although such a bluff seemed insane to him. It does make sense in its context.
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Having already lost the political will to default, the success of the bluff would have very
high returns, but its failure would only lead to them paying and agreeing to a third
bailout, which was the status quo trajectory of events. As such while completely
incomprehensible to Varoufakis, their big gamble was low risk and high reward, a
typically good gamble. More interestingly they were right; Lagarde took Varoufakis’
meeting well and by the end had effectively called the bluff89. Greece did not seem to
suffer any punishment for this attempted default that it would not have otherwise
suffered.

The Sack
While the following months were filled with details and anecdotes, none of them
served to alter the course of events. As the Greek coffers emptied, Greece missed its
payment for June 5th as expected. The IMF unilaterally bundled the missed payments
with a later payment at the end of the month, but since the math did not change Greece’s
failure to pay at the end of June was not in doubt90 . By June 26th as the last attempts -no
matter how faint their hopes of success -at renegotiation failed and the Troika steeled its
position. The end of June would see the loan extension expiring as well as the coming
due of over 1.2 billion Euros to the IMF. Syriza came to a decision to put the acceptance
to a referendum to be held on July 5th where the Greek people can directly say yes or no
to the proposed bailout. Syriza’s request for a short extension to cover an extra week for
the referendum to take place was refused by the Troika91.
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Greece would default on June 30th92 as it failed to pay the IMF again. After five
days of bank lines, cash withdrawal limits and the doom and gloom of default, 61.3% of
voters refused the Troika’s package93, giving Syriza a clear mandate forged in the fire of
default to refuse the ultimatum. However the will to use default as a tool of defiance
faded three months earlier. Greece would not trigger the SMP haircut for retaliation and
go its own way. Varoufakis resigned on the next morning, and his successor Euclid
Tsakalotos immediately began to negotiate the third bailout despite the express wishes of
the Greek people.
In less than a week the third bailout was signed, hours before another IMF tranche
came due on July 13th94, and more importantly before the SMP bonds came due later that
month. On July 16th another austerity bill was passed, one of four Syriza would shepherd
through the Hellenic parliament. Syriza’s popularity waned as its rhetoric against
austerity directly contravened the austerity measures it enacted. With defections rising,
Tsipras had to call another snap election in September that saw Syriza win by the skin of
its teeth as it shed almost an eighth of its supporters in eight months. In 2019 Syriza lost
to New Democracy as it continued to splinter further. Greece's debt stocks continued to
increase as its GDP stagnated, while unemployment started decreasing, Greece did not
recover to pre-crisis levels on any major economic indicators.
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During and after the crisis the metaphysical argument that the Greeks were
inherently lazy, profligate, and unscrupulous people found a home on the pages of
respected journals and magazines95. Media representations often completely
decontextualized the Greek crisis in an arguably propagandistic manner, of which the
Greeks themselves were fully aware. This belittling was also extended to Greek proposals
during the crisis. However, the fact that only a month after the third bailout was signed,
Ukraine availed itself of a deal very similar to the one the Greeks sought, including
extending debt maturities, write-downs, and GDP indexed bonds96 reveals that the
proposal’s feasibility was not a valid reason for Troika objections. In fact, feasibility was
not at all an important factor in the Troika’s decision-making process as evidenced by
pursuing a policy in Greece that the IMF had acknowledged cannot work in private since
2011 and in public since august 201597.
Having removed the economic feasibility argument against renegotiations, it
follows that the Troika’s choices were dictated by political considerations instead of
economic reasoning. While the Troika saw a lot of moments of factional disagreements
between various actors such as the IMF and ECB, between France and Germany, and
even between Merkel and Schauble98 -who represented the same state- over the
particularities of how to handle the Greek debt crisis, there was a broad understanding
that acquiescing to renegotiation would be tantamount to an admission of guilt and
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responsibility for the humanitarian crisis that has unfolded. This was supplemented by a
leadership -manifested in Germany, the beating heart of European capital- that managed
to cow dissidents within its own ranks time after time. This meant that any challenge to
the status quo would have to come entirely from within the Greek polity.
This is to say that salvation for Greece had to come from within, and even though
the relationship reified in debt is a very unbalanced power relation where the lender will
always have more power than the borrower and can seek to supplement this power
through codifying and institutionalizing its power; the outcome is far from
predetermined. As such, discrete actions and choices made by faction leaders and
representatives arguably had more to do with the defeat of the Greek alliance than the
sheer arcane inertia of institutions opposing it.
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III. Puerto Rico: The Glacial Crisis of the Caribbean
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Terms of Integration: The Root Cause
It might be quite unexpected to think of the world’s oldest existing colony as
being sup-optimally integrated into the hegemonic world system led by its direct colonial
overlord. However, it is that suboptimal integration that meant that Puerto Rico’s place in
the hierarchy had to be modified twice in the last 100 years. The Island was colonized by
the Spanish crown just one year after Columbus’ infamous journey to the new world.
Between 1493 and 1898 the island was controlled by Spain and ran a colonial economy
growing cash crops such as sugarcane and tobacco to fuel the Spanish empire, and except
for a brief -albeit temporary and unprotected- ascent to the status of a province with
representation in the Spanish Parliament “Cortes”99, the island remained in all respects a
colony. During the Spanish-American War, the United States of America successfully
invaded the island and took it in the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the U.S. interest in the island
was strategic as well as economic. Interests that Elihu Root - then U.S. secretary of war extolled in a report to Congress in 1899, detailing how to best exploit them while
avoiding enfranchising the island’s inhabitants100. The fact that the first major mention of
the Island in congress was solely dedicated to ensuring its exploitation without granting it
representation is very telling of the intent of the American capital at the time and a
precedent that would remain an honored tradition to this day. In 1900 congress signed the
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Foraker Act granting Puerto Rico the right to organized government, allowing it a
popularly elected lower house, and the U.S. appointed upper house and governor, with
the U.S. congress retaining the right to overturn any laws passed by the Puerto Rican
legislature. In 1901 the insular cases added insult to injury by declaring that only the
fundamental constitutional rights extended to unincorporated territories such as Puerto
Rico, and the rest can be only conferred by congress at its own leisure. The discussion for
the insular cases which are still affecting Puerto Ricans until this day is rife with racism
and xenophobia, to say the least, Justice Henry Billings Brown cited his concerns vis-avis “differences of race, habits, laws, and customs of the people,” as well as “differences
of soil, climate and production.”101. In 1917 citizenship was imposed on the people of
Puerto Rico through the Jones Act, this imposition was a move to curb the Puerto Rican
independence movement, which culminated in 1914 in a house of Representatives
unanimous vote for independence which was rejected by the U.S. Congress as
unconstitutional102. The Jones Act passage and the citizenship it granted did not give
Puerto Ricans the right to vote in national elections, but did allow them to be forcibly
conscripted for World War One, to freely elect their senate, and most importantly granted
them access to US mainland103. It also granted Puerto Rico’s municipal bonds the “triple
exempt”104 status105. This status meant that Puerto Rico’s municipal bonds were tax
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exempted on the municipal, state, and federal level, making it a pure profit investment for
the lenders, and an easy way to fund the island’s chronic budget deficit.
As the world economy developed, Puerto Rico lagged, its mainly agricultural
economy was faltering and cash crops became a less reliable source of income in an
increasingly industrialized world. In 1948 President Truman’s administration introduced
“Operation Bootstrap”. The Operation was an industrialization program aimed at
promoting Puerto Rico as a paragon of the virtues of U.S. economic values. During the
1950s the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the island grew by 68%, and in the
following decade an astounding 90%, during this period manufacturing rose from
negligible levels to contribute 40% of the island nation’s GDP106. These developments on
the island were coupled by U.S. diplomatic propaganda that culminated in the removal of
Puerto Rico from the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories by resolution
748 of the General Assembly. The American delegation argued that since Puerto Rico
had been given the right to elect its governor -in 1947 Elective Governor Act- along with
the upper and lower house of its parliament it was a self-governing territory and that the
operation Bootstrap coupled with Public Law 600 establishing Puerto Rico as a
commonwealth have shown that the U.S. was a benevolent partner rather than an
exploitative overlord. The passage of the 748 resolution was a great victory of American
imperialism and allowed the exploitation of Puerto Rico to continue with limited
scrutiny107.
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However, the turbulence of the 1970s oil shocks disturbed the island economy
greatly as it relied on oil for power generation, the concurrent stagflation was detrimental
to the recently established industries and posed a tangible threat to the “American
Dream” that Puerto Rico was supposed to embody. As the 1970s lurched onwards
Operation Bootstrap was gradually doomed, and the island began to deepen its reliance
on debt. Operation Bootstrap was the first major adjustment in the terms of integration
for Puerto Rico. Although the U.S. has been gradually adjusting the island and constantly
reorienting it towards the mainland’s needs through systemic proletarization and
dispossession that aimed to force the islanders into a waged work system that suited the
U.S. it was Bootstrap that truly changed the Island. The shift from agricultural to
industrial work was not motivated by the gregarious nature of Truman but was a
continuation of the policies set by Root and his ilk in the first year of colonization. The
island’s agricultural economy was now a diminished asset. Industrialization was the
answer. Puerto Rico offered a haven for investors, the island had direct access to the U.S.
market with low-waged workers lacking federal protections, a great outlet for the excess
capital of the post-war economic boom.
The industrialization program also helped integrate the island’s labor in the
American economy, both on the island and the mainland as the development of the
Puerto Rican economy necessitated labor’s acquisition of industrial skills that allowed it
to take advantage of its access to the U.S. labor market. These skills combined with the
crushing of the Puerto Rican Nationalist uprising in 1950 and the disillusionment that
followed saw more than 700 thousand Puerto Ricans leave for the mainland between
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1950 and 1970.108 These combined push and pull factors saw the population of Puerto
Ricans on the mainland outpace the growth of that on the island. It also had a
compounding effect on the success of Operation Bootstrap as the simultaneous siphoning
of disgruntled labor and injection of capital allowed the island to average 6% real GNP
growth for these two decades109. The spirit of Root’s report lived on as the U.S. continued
to exploit the island in new ways while avoiding enfranchising its populace. The Puerto
Rican boom encouraged returning to the higher rates of borrowing that prevailed until the
late 1930s, between 1969 and 1973 the island’s borrowing increased by roughly 90%. By
1974 the island experienced its first debt crisis as its borrowing surpassed the limit
imposed in its constitution110.

Easy Credit: A mess of pottage
In 1976, as stagflation reached its crescendo the U.S. government approved
section 936 of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) code. Section 936 was a measure by
which U.S. transnational corporations received tax exemptions on all their profits
reported in Puerto Rico and transferred to the mainland, so long as these profits remained
in earmarked bank deposits in Puerto Rico for no less than five years, and a tollgate tax of
2 percent was paid. Thus section 936 effectively established Puerto Rico as a domestic
tax haven for American capital. As a result investments from the mainland returned,
especially in industries where patents played an important role in profit generation such
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as pharmaceuticals. American drug giants sold their drug patents to their Puerto Rican
subsidiaries, allowing for all royalties on the patent to be registered on the island, as well
as manufacturing the final product111. The section succeeded in buying time for the
island and mitigated the effects of the 1970s crisis on it while benefiting American capital
first and foremost.
For twenty years after its introduction, section 936 was the lifeblood of the Puerto
Rican economy, capital utilizing the 936 mechanisms was averaging around one-third of
all bank deposits during that period and reaching over 42% of all bank deposits in
1985112. By 1996 it registered over 15.4 billion USD of direct investments, the highest
U.S. foreign direct investment in the world at the time by a significant margin. However,
it was also in 1996 that the U.S. Congress decided to repeal section 936 by phasing it
over 10 years. Making 2005 the final year when the section will apply, giving capital
plenty of time to rearrange its operations113. Between 1996 and 2006, the island’s
banking sector lost more than 7.4 billion USD in deposits, constraining the cash supply
on the island significantly114. The repeal of 936 was not the only shock to Puerto Rico’s
economy. The creation of the World Trade Organization also negatively affected Puerto
Rico’s value for its masters in the mainland as the privilege of national treatment for
companies in Puerto Rico became obsolete due to the resulting international regulations
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and free trade agreements115. The repeal of 936 was not unexpected since the world’s
financial regulations loosened and as tax avoidance operations became a complex art.
The financial deregulation, collapse of empires, and their unique segmented tax
systems allowed for higher capital mobility116 but also created a drive to seek these same
exemptions afforded by the empire. This meant that while governments were trying to
attract this newly hyper-mobile capital117, armies of accountants, lawyers, and assorted
consultants were being trained in tax avoidance to direct capital to these tax havens. The
weakening of the socialist bloc and the waning influence of communism also meant that
many of these tax havens were safe from socialist revolutions that could expropriate their
hoards.118 As a result, while trillions of dollars have been siphoned from the global
economy and directed to tax havens, these havens benefited greatly, while the global
economy grew an average of 1.4% between 1982 and 1999, tax havens grew by more
than double at 3.3%119. The strong performance of tax haven economies necessarily begs
the question of why Puerto Rico turned away from it, especially considering that tax
havens’ reversal of policies would result in a significant reduction in the volume and
speed of international money120. Decisions that decrease the velocity and elasticity of
foreign capital in a state are rarely contemplated since that goes against the incentives and
imperatives enshrined in the capitalist system. The government of Puerto Rico still
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needed American capital, but American capital was no longer in need of Puerto Rico. The
island colony had served its role for the period.
Through its life as a colony, Puerto Rico was never the master of its own finances
as it remained very much under the mainland’s thumb. Its economic situation is always
worsened by the fact that it has all the obligations of other states, but less in its arsenal to
address them. Since the American subjugation of the island roughly twelve decades ago
the island’s reliance on debt to finance its government was only interrupted between the
1940s and 1960s. Puerto Rico’s dependence on American capital to create jobs and drive
development on the island renders it hostage to that capital, as it cannot contend with it
on equal footing, so it can only submit. This has resulted in the Puerto Rican government
adopting pro-business tax policies that favor low taxes for companies and corporations in
hope of luring investments. This meant that the island’s tax revenues chronically fell
short of its needs. On the other hand, Puerto Rico’s triple tax-exempt status makes its
bonds extremely sought after by American investors. This constant supply of bond buyers
meant that Puerto Rico never had a shortage of cash, which along with the belief that the
U.S. government would eventually bail it out in case of default, kept the Island’s credit
ratings high well beyond the point of no return. Puerto Rico became addicted to debt.
Forcibly so.
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Figure 1121

These loans did not all go to financing necessary or remunerative projects, in fact,
some of them were directed into “megaprojects” that ended up driving the insular
government further into debt. One major culprit is the Puerto Rico Convention Center
District Authority. The district authority was originally intended to just manage the
convention center built on the site of an old military base, however, its portfolio grew
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rather impressively. In 2004 the District Authority inherited the soon-to-open convention
center along with its credit line of 415 million USD, as well as Agrelot Coliseum which
had a line of credit of 230 million USD, hence accruing 645 million USD in debt in one
year. The District Authority was also granted the right to issue bonds, a power it used to
its full extent in 2006 when it issued a bond by the Hotel Room Tax revenue for over 468
million USD, which by the end of its payment will have netted the District Authority a
cost of roughly 800 million USD. The debt-ridden Authority has been making losses
since its establishment except for the years 2011, and 2012, with no end to the losing
streak in sight122.
Emilio Pantojas-García dates that kind of focus on propagandistic “mega
projects” to the administration of Pedro Rosselló, an obsession that remains to this day.
Other projects included two natural gas pipelines, the super aqueduct, and the Urban
Train123. The Urban Train alone cost 2.5 billion USD (1 billion more than its original
budget) and currently loses over 50 million dollars annually due to low ticket sales,
which hover around a third of what it needs to breakeven124. The only economically
viable project of these, was the only necessary one, the Super Aqueduct125. As the
Island’s government is fundamentally lacking in power considering the colonial context
in which it exists, megaprojects become a disproportionately important source of
legitimacy both through sheer propagandization of the projects and also through
awarding contracts to favored political patrons.
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Market Shock: Scraping the barrel
The Market shock in question here unfolded at a rather glacial pace, as it started
with the repeal of section 936 in 1996 and manifested gradually over the next two
decades. However, the pace of the crisis is irrelevant when the subjects affected cannot
make the decisions necessary to brace for it. With the announcement of the phasing out of
936 in 1996 over a decade, capital that made use of the section started to retreat from the
island, slowly but surely deindustrializing Puerto Rico. As previously mentioned, the
island’s banking sector was already bleeding 936 deposits. In the factories, the picture
was even grimmer as by the end of 936 in 2005, Puerto Rico lost 36,000 manufacturing
jobs out of the 153,000 that existed in 2000. Almost a quarter of workers in
manufacturing were out of a job within 5 years, and even though the trend slowed after
the repeal -as mainland corporates had already adjusted by firing all expendable labor
before the deadline- it did not halt. By 2014 a further 42,000 workers in manufacturing
lost their livelihoods, reducing manufacturing jobs to just 75,000 by 2014, less than half
of the 2000 figure. That deterioration is not surprising considering that over the same
period real growth investment would also decrease by an average of 2.3% annually126.
Capital flight and the ensuing constriction of available funds simultaneously
forced Puerto Rico to continue borrowing on increasingly more dangerous terms while
depriving it of the only asset that could have proved useful in the crisis, its skilled
workforce. As the crisis deepened not only did sectors like manufacturing end up
shrinking, but even government workers found themselves at the crosshairs as a third of
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them were fired in 2009127. This created significant pressure on the island’s workforce to
emigrate to the mainland triggering a massive exodus from the island nation. According
to U.S. Census Bureau data by 2018 Puerto Rico had already lost over 600,000 people to
emigration out of the 3.8 million persons that populated the island in 2000128, decreasing
the population by over 15%129. San Juan, saw its population shrink by 18% between 2000
and 2015, and the rate of vacancy in housing increased from 10.2% to an astounding
23.5%130, with almost one in four houses vacant even before the devastating Hurricane
Maria hit in 2017 and triggered a wave of 160,000 Puerto Ricans to head to the
mainland131.
Worse still, this wave of emigration did not translate into remittances that could
help buoy the economy back home. While there is not a lot of scholarship on why
remittances from the mainland to Puerto Rico are low, there is enough to prove that it is
abnormally low. Jorge Duany shows that Puerto Ricans’ economic behavior veers sharply
from comparable immigrant labor groups. Few Puerto Ricans send money back home
from the mainland and those who do send less than their Caribbean counterparts do. As
such remittances contributed an average of a measly half percent to the island’s GDP
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since the 1980’s, compared to an average of 15% of GDP in other Caribbean nations132.
This could be the result of many factors, including the unrestricted movement of capital
and labor between the mainland and the island, the extension of federal programs to the
island, and more importantly the absence of a currency mismatch. All of this means that
simply there are not enough distortions between the home market and the host market for
remittances to exploit. That is to say, that contrary to other cases where remittances offset
the economic cost of emigration, in the case of Puerto Rico that silver lining does not
break through. Meaning that immigration to the mainland only helped the island in so
much as to alleviate the chronically high unemployment burden. All of these factors
conspired to leave Puerto Rico worse for wear as the gap between revenues and expenses
widened, debt grew faster than the economy itself, a situation much worsened when the
economy started contracting. By 2016 the situation was untenable, and an intervention
from a higher power - an imperial power- was needed.

Political Crisis: What can be done?
Due to Puerto Rico’s status as a colony of an uncontested global hegemon, spaces
for resistance are heavily restricted. Popular resistance to changes in the social contract or
changes in the historic bloc often attempts a change in the ruling coalition as the primary
vehicle for renegotiating the terms of debts or even contesting their validity. However, as
Puerto Ricans have a very restricted form of autonomy, even changing the government
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would not be as potent a tactic, as the government itself does not have the power to
contend with the U.S. Congress which has the supreme say over the island.
The political establishment’s capture by what is often termed the Criollo bloc
coupled with the impotence of the Puerto Rican government meant that what resistance
would transpire could not be practiced in the halls of political government, but instead in
public spaces. As such public spaces can either be captured by force of an insurrection or
non-violent propaganda of the deed. Notwithstanding that an armed insurrection against
the mightiest military on the planet could be infeasible, it understandably does not seem
to capture the islanders’ imagination or support; The suppression of the 1950 insurrection
was swift and brutal, the use of warplanes to quell the unrest signaled to Puerto Ricans
that armed struggle would be met by excessive force. As such art or cultural artifacts that
seek to contest the narrative became the most observable method of resistance. The first
sign of that popular upswell is the common referral to the current administration on the
island as the la junta, a term used derisively for military or occupation governments.133
Brigada Puerta de Tierra (BPdT) a local community organization on the frontlines of
debt-wrought displacement has been deploying artistic means such as graffiti, songs,
dances, and occupations when needed.134 While that kind of protest might be derided by
some as ineffective, it serves to shape the narrative of resistance, ensuring that the ruling
criollo bloc and Washington D.C. do not get to ignore the suffering of the disaffected
when crafting the tapestry of their narrative. In short, BPdT other cultural resistance
movements use the spaces that are available to them to their full potential to ensure
discord is not erased and that authorities cannot go unchallenged, even if the challenge is
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symbolic. Lastly, the biggest sign of crisis is the immigration wave out of the island and
to the mainland. The exodus of Puerto Ricans crossing to the mainland for their own
good, an unenviable decision. More remain on their island, defiant in the face of a crisis
waiting for a brighter future that would not be dominated by laws and decrees handed
down from the mainland.

La Junta:
The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
(PROMESA) was the mainland’s response to the crisis. The law was the result of an
increasing cultural pressure building up in the mainland as ever more Puerto Ricans
arrived bringing tales of ever-worsening conditions. The federal law enacted on June
30th, 2016 created the PROMESA board, a presidentially appointed board with no input
from the Puerto Ricans themselves with sweeping powers over their lives135. To mitigate
the bitterness of what amounted to the imposition of direct rule from the mainland the
law also allowed a stay on litigation that can be imposed while the board negotiates to
restructure the island’s debt. On July 1st the Puerto Rican government suspended debt
repayments avoiding a 1.9 billion USD repayment that was due on the same day136.
Even with that stay of execution, the PROMESA board was immediately derided
as a fundamentally unrepresentative and unaccountable body, quickly earning the
nickname La Junta. La junta was in no way an exaggerated expression, the board was
given the right to enter contracts on behalf of the island, and a clear mandate to prohibit
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striking by sector employees137. Not only was it legally independent from any influence
of Puerto Rican institutions whether it was the governorship or the legislature, but the law
also stipulated that these institutions cannot act in a way that would impair the purposes
of the board138. Finally, the board and its members could not be held legally liable for its
actions139. As such the PROMESA board was very overtly an institutional manifestation
of an unfettered imperial will. These sweeping dictatorial powers of the board could only
have been forged at the intersection of debt and colonialism; two of the clearest forms of
power imbalance. The board’s main source of power is its raison d’etre; that is the
bankruptcy-like process it allows Puerto Rico to enter and more importantly the
preceding negotiations to avoid a bankruptcy case. Puerto Rico’s colonial status means
that it cannot default as a sovereign nation can, while leaving it exempt from the right to
go bankrupt like other U.S. municipalities, as such the creation of the board allowed
Puerto Rico to access this right to restructure its debts. However, that access can be
extended only at the sufferance of the board, as it can also end the bankruptcy-like
process if it feels the Puerto Rican government is not being serious enough. That is to say
that while the Puerto Rican government had to negotiate with creditors it was also
negotiating with the board to continue enjoying the right of negotiating with the creditors,
and when all is said and done, only the board had the right to force Puerto Rico into
bankruptcy140.
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In the shadow of this new authority, the 2016 elections took place and saw
Ricardo Rosello of the statehood oriented New Progressive Party elected governor amidst
a palpable decline in turnout as Puerto Ricans were emigrating out of the island in droves.
The bonafide scion of an upcoming criollo dynasty; Ricardo’s Father -Pedro- governed
the island between 1993 and 2001, overseeing the prelude to the crisis, and arguably
played a role in inviting it. Ricardo the younger ran on a platform of seeking statehood
and renegotiation with debtors that would avert the worst and protect pensioners.
However, it did not take long to break what will he might have had to fight. Even while
asking for quite modest haircuts, debtors could easily see that he had no real power to
force them to accept his terms. The only real power over Puerto Rico was the oversight
board, sitting in New York, safely away from the island and its increasingly frequent
protests. Rosello failed to reach a negotiated settlement with creditors even as the board
allowed him more time to negotiate. He discovered a 7.5 billion USD deficit which meant
that he was running out of time while creditors could afford to wait. By the advent of
May, Rosello’s government had to face legal action as the court stay ended, with the
government of Puerto Rico filing for the bankruptcy-like protections afforded by
PROMESA on May 3rd141.
Only a few days later, Rosello announced cuts across the board including the
closure of 184 schools and pensions cuts across the board as he prepared a budget for the
board’s approval142. It is important to highlight that these cuts had no bearing on the
crisis. Rosello, and Padilla before him repeatedly expressed that austerity alone cannot
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solve the crisis as they both enacted austerity measures. This ritual mutilation of the
island’s economy to prove to the federal government how badly help is needed reinforced
the grotesque feeling about seeking a closer union with a government that seemed
uncaring, and Rosello’s public support started to dwindle rapidly. Even before his official
turnaround protests against Rosello escalated as thousands of workers protested on May
Day launching a strike. After the announcement of budget cuts to education, students
joined in the fray pouring into the streets in their thousands as the island’s resistance
became more galvanized and militant since the mainland intervened, but did not side with
the Puerto Rican people143.
In June and July, the island was roiled by unrest and Rosello put forth his budget
conforming to the PROMESA board’s turnaround plan which saw massive cuts to
government purchases, payroll, and no clear answer for how to keep the pension funds
afloat or even repay the debt144. The Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority (PREPA)
filed for bankruptcy-like protections afforded by PROMESA mere days after as it
struggled to service its 9 billion USD debt145. All of this was overshadowed by the
landfall of Hurricane Maria devastating the island killing nearly 3000 residents and
destroying much of the already insufficient infrastructure and taking the power grid
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completely offline,146 and ravaging the coffee planting industry147. The lackluster federal
response inflamed tensions even higher as Puerto Ricans felt completely abandoned by
the mainland government dictating their lives through the board. An errant remark from
President Donald Trump mentioning wiping out the Island’s debt in October 2017 saw
the market for Puerto Rican bonds dive until the secretary of treasury cleared it up saying
that the president spoke figuratively148.
From there on protests continued apace with the government’s reforms as the
island suffered through a very sluggish recovery. In June of 2018 Rosello approved a law
that would allow for PERPA to be privatized raising the ire of Puerto Ricans who rightly
felt that they were being squeezed further in their time of need149. A month later Rosello
signed an executive order raising the minimum wage for government-contracted workers
to 15 USD per hour in an apparent attempt to ameliorate some of the worst effects of the
crisis. This measure’s success was doubted from the beginning as government contracts
have naturally shrunk due to the austerity measures imposed by Rosello earlier150. The
austerity measures as implemented by Rosello significantly reduced the state’s patronage
system, as the allocation of government contracts is the primary conduit of power for the
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island’s non-sovereign executive. That is to say, austerity whittled down the already thin
support for the island’s government with most reforms geared to those still retained on
the payrolls and not the ones who fell through the cracks.
By July 2019 Rosello’s failures had piled up, ranging from the failure to uphold
his campaign promises, or manage the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, in addition to the
layoffs and privatizations as his administration became mired in corruption charges151.
The leak of hundreds of pages of his communication with his staff was the straw that
broke the camel’s back, reigniting protests demanding his removal along with the
PROMESA board. However, Rosello’s denigration of the board itself in the leaked
messages meant that he would have no backing from the mainland152.
The protests coverage in US media portrayed as anti-corruption protests
specifically against Rosello and barely acknowledged any anti-austerity or anti-junta
character of the protests. Rosello became unable to continue under the pressure of daily
protests and resigned attempting to plant Pedro Pierluisi as his successor by appointing
him secretary of state, seemingly to protect himself. Pedro was not recognized by the
Puerto Rican senate and a legal dispute over Rosello’s succession lasted for a week
afterward 153. Thrown out of the governor’s office by the court in August 2019, Pedro
Pierluisi won the governorship of the island in November 2020 by a slight plurality on
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the same day as a nonbinding referendum on statehood passed by a 5 point margin in a
scene that exposed the futility of playing politics on the island.
While continuing the status quo became an untenable situation for Puerto Ricans,
it has not for the U.S. government. While Puerto Ricans have held six referenda in the
last thirty years that demonstrated time and again the growing untenability of the reality
of colonialism on the island. As Puerto Rican capital manifested in the criollo political
elite seeks a closer union that would afford it mainland protections and perks, a strong
independence-oriented tradition persists and remains popular among the Puerto Rican
population at large. Meanwhile, the colonial nature of the commonwealth is laid bare by
the sweeping powers of the board that is accountable to none of these forces and only
represents New York capital. Since U.S. capital actively benefits from Puerto Rico’s
territorial status to either use it as an internal tax haven, a tax-exempt money-making
machine for financial capital, and an appreciated subsidy for the U.S. shipping industry
by way of the Jones Act, it has an active interest in keeping the territorial status so
derided by the locals.
As such debt functions to set an economic parameter to a political question as the
high debt levels make independence functionally impossible due to the immediate and
necessary default and subsequent loss of access to financial markets, hence making it a
fool’s errand. At the same time, the debt also makes statehood politically difficult as it
would be quite easy to oppose admission to a bankrupt state. Hence the debt accrued by
the island goaded by mainland policy functions to nullify Puerto Ricans’ political will
and acts as an economic baffle that ensures that even when Puerto Ricans try to force a
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change in the status quo it necessarily has to be closer to the U.S. to shield it from
liability and not away from access to U.S. dollars and aid.

Resolution:
1,600 miles away from San Juan streets roiled by hurricanes, scandals, austerity,
and protests, the PROMESA board continued to meet and exercise its prerogative as the
sole economic arbiter of the island. For more than five years the board oversaw lengthy
negotiations between Puerto Rico and its creditors. Until 2019, the board’s only success
was restructuring the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico’s (GDB) debt
accounting for less than 7% of the debt in 2017, a testament to the creditors’ resistance as
they could afford to wait, while the island’s government could not. The fact that the GDB
is functionally an organ of the government of the island explains the relative speed of the
agreement. However, it would not be until 2019 that a significant chunk of Puerto Rico’s
seventy billion dollars debt would be restructured as the U.S. court approved the
restructuring of the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Revenue Bonds -also known as COFINA154
bonds-. After acrimonious disputes as the junior bondholders felt that they are made to
bear the burden of the restructuring as well as between General Obligations (GO)
bondholders and COFINA bondholders155; the court ruled in favor of a deal that cut 18
billion USD in COFINA bonds to about 12 billion USD as well as freed sales tax revenue
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previously dedicated to COFINA to also finance repayment of GO bonds156. The board
also oversaw agreements that would reduce PERPA’s debt by about 30% and lower
Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewers Authority’s (PRASA) annual debt obligations. While
the PRASA deal passed157, the PERPA deal is yet to go through. With these deals in
place -only PERPA still outstanding- about 37 billion USD is consolidated into roughly
26 billion USD.
A settlement for the other 33 billion USD is currently in the U.S. district court158.
This settlement is to see the significant haircuts needed to ensure that this restructuring
actually saves Puerto Rico from the abyss. 22 billion USD owed on GO bonds and Public
Buildings Authority (PBA) bonds would be swapped for 7 billion USD cash award and
7.4 billion USD in new bonds reducing the debt load to around 34 billion USD. Through
the process, the board has allayed creditors’ fears and gained their support for the deal,159
slowly but surely, as it battled Governor Pierluisi over pension cuts that he ran against160.
Although often having to face Pierluisi, the Junta effectively had a veto over him,
and as such in his official capacity as governor he would often be subsumed by the board.
However, during negotiations, three specific factions seemed to have clashed the most
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with the board. The first was the retail bondholders161, the private investors valorized by
republican senators as the victims of a bailout. The retail bondholders however did not
represent a strong enough faction to avoid shouldering the haircuts, which meant that
they would have to suffer a much more disproportionate share of the cut than institutional
investors162.
On the other side, the teachers’ unions were the second faction clashing with the
board, and often Pierluisi too. The Teacher’s Federation of Puerto Rico (FMPR)163
repeatedly opposed the board and called on the governor and the legislature to oppose it
too164. The FMPR’s opposition ranged from declarations to marches and protests and left
a mark. The board dedicated one of the few factsheets published to directly address the
FMPR claims and enlists the support of other teachers’ unions that support it including
the mainland American Federation of Teachers as well as smaller teachers’ unions on the
island165. The unionists and pensioners rightly felt that they have already paid enough and
should not be saddled with more austerity. The board’s plans insisted on phasing out the
pension system through freezing benefits and transitioning to a defined contribution plan,
a massive downgrade as defined contribution plans are only effective if the employee can
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spare the contribution to be matched166. In an island with a 45% poverty rate, a defined
contribution plan would be adding insult to injury. Not to mention a flurry of changes that
Puerto Ricans saw as death by a thousand cuts bringing what welfare and rights the island
had to an end.
Both Rosello the younger and Pierluisi ran on platforms that promised no cuts to
pensioners, Rosello eventually caved to the board, not that he had a choice. The board
bore all the awe-inspiring weight of the U.S. government and while it can be antagonized
by decisions here and there, it cannot be defied without risking unthinkable ramifications.
When Pierluisi attempted to reassure pensioners by signing the Dignified Retirement Act
that would honor his zero cuts to pensions pledge, he was sued by the Board167. Pierluisi
immediately filed for a stay on the trial of the case,168 probably recognizing the ease with
which the board might win the case. While this does not comply with the oversight
board’s strategy which would see pension cuts imposed on 30% of its recipients169; it is
arguably not necessary for the debt restructuring package, as even though pensions lack
funding, the social and contingent economic costs of throwing 30% of pensioners into
precarity is too great. As the debt restructuring hinged on reaching an agreement on
pensions, the Puerto Ricans felt confident enough that the board will not throw out the
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deal just on the pension issue170, especially that the cuts amounted to nothing more than a
self-flagellation that would bring nothing but pain to the island while actively hindering
the recovery of its economy. Eventually, they were vindicated as the Oversight Board
agreed to remove the cuts from the plan171. A symbolic win for the island but not much
more than that.
The island has already been wracked by debt; years of austerity and cuts to
services made the impact of hurricanes and earthquakes much worse than they could have
been. Massive loss of human resources as almost a quarter of the island population has
left among increasing inequality and poverty, as the middle class who could afford to
leave departs the island; the social chasm on the island between the criollo bloc and the
dejected urban poor widens further. The deal put forth by the board and the island’s
government will not change any of that, while the judge is yet to issue a verdict, her
assent is assumed at this point, as the Board and the island’s government would not risk
putting a deal at this late of a stage that would be rejected. The debt has already done its
job, and excess cruelty could risk feelings of indignance turning into sentiments of
independence.
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IV. Ecuador: The Art of Default
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Stability is not a feature of Ecuadorian political history, the country’s history is
littered with the coups and revolutions that characterize modern Latin American history.
That is to say, this instability is not a cultural feature, but an economic one. The
availability of native land that can be expropriated and exploited, meant that governments
could always attempt to stave off political conflicts around economic resources by
borrowing, both politically and economically against the promise of the unspoiled
frontier. As such whenever the frontier ends the conflict put on hold by that expansion is
reanimated, sometimes violently sometimes not. Economically, this was mirrored in the
cycles of commodity booms Ecuador’s fertile farmlands provided. The sugar, coffee,
cocoa, and banana booms and busts track the rise and fall of political projects and
fortunes. The easy credit incurred in these booms would lead Ecuador to many debt crises
and defaults. For the majority of the cocoa, boom starting in the late 19th century and
ending in the mid-twenties, Ecuador was the world’s largest producer of cocoa until the
West African cocoa plantations displaced it in 1916172. During this period cocoa
accounted for 70% of Ecuadorian exports. Fertile lands coupled with cheap oppressed
labor as well as a natural riverine transport system allowed the “Kings of Cocoa” around
the Guayaquil port city to amass wealth through cocoa trade and exports. The kings of
cocoa were by far the most dominant capital faction -thanks to access to coveted hard
currency- during the rise and fall of the liberal radical party which coincided with the
cocoa boom173. Even before the kings of cocoa Guayaquil was the biggest and most
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important city in the pacific coast region and has always been a center of the region’s
export of commodities to the world market, whether it was coffee, cocoa, or the
upcoming banana. As such the coast often benefitted from these booms more than the
mountainous Sierra did, while they both equally suffered the crashes. This led to the
emergence of a more populist political culture in Quito - the Sierra’s heart-, which has a
significantly larger indigenous population and usually displays more redistributive
tendencies, as the Sierra’s economy is mostly geared towards internal consumption174.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Ecuador got a second wind as it was the world’s
largest exporter of bananas during the banana boom, between 1960 and 1971 banana
exports would account for an average of 7% of Ecuadorian GDP175. It is important to note
that this was after banana prices started falling when United Fruit developed new diseaseresistant strains. Starting in the sixties, with the first banana export failure, the country’s
four-time president José María Velasco Ibarra was removed in one of the many coups
that removed or instituted him, and a project of import substitution industrialization was
launched. Industrialization seemed like the only option to bring the country out of the
commodity boom and bust cycle by creating an internally oriented industrial economy.
However, this project would lag as the funds for it would not be available until another
commodity boom176. This time in the least powerful and most exploited of the three
regions, the predominantly indigenous Amazonian Oriente region, as massive oil deposits
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were discovered177. The subject of this study will be the ensuing oil commodity boom
and the extended debt crisis and defaults that followed.

Easy Credit: Gold, Black, and Green
In 1970 Ecuador exported only 38.8 tons of oil, slightly less than 250 barrels a
year178. The country was already expected to increase that rapidly; recent discoveries in
the Oriente region by a Texaco-Gulf consortium along with the installation of the TransEcuadorian Pipeline (SOTE) meant that Ecuador’s oil output was bound to increase. By
all measures no one expected Ecuador to be a major producer of oil, but as the scope and
quality of discoveries were revealed calls for nationalization ramped up, and eventually, a
coup forced President Ibarra to nationalize the oil fields179. President Ibarra was overly
familiar with coups, he was deposed and imposed by coups in the past, in this one he
survived, but had to capitulate to the coup leaders, forming a civilian dictatorship. It
would not be long before Ibarra is fully deposed though, and a full military dictatorship is
instituted as another coup fully removes him from power.
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The Junta inherited an optimal situation for rent extraction. An incoherent
capitalist class divided between the Quito and Guayaquil factions, and a heavily fractured
working class divided along ethnic and ideological lines, and 1.5 billion barrels of oil in
indigenous lands180. The waves of colonization and value extraction that shaped Ecuador
had resulted in a deeply economically unequal and socially fragmented state as it grew in
patches around extraction sites. As such, even though it is tempting to speak of the
Guayaquil externally-oriented commercial and financial capital in contrast to the more
industrially inclined inward-looking Quito faction, both Guayaquil and Quito factions
were often divided within themselves. The working classes in Ecuador did not fare much
better181. They were divided geographically between the Pacific coast, the Andean Sierra,
and the Amazonian Oriente. They were divided among ethnic lines between Europeans,
Mestizos, Indigenous peoples, and Afro-Ecuadorians. They were also heavily divided
ideologically between Christian syndicalists, Marxist workers, Maoist teachers, and
conservative unionists. Still, it was an eclectic collection of such forces uniting under a
single banner and calling for a general strike in 1971 against Ibarra’s anti-labor policies
that brought down his regime182.
The 1973 October war and ensuing oil embargo, sent oil prices booming, giving
Ecuador access to a massive unexpected windfall that turbocharged its economy for a
decade allowing it to grow tenfold183. The Government, in its role as owner of
Petroecuador suddenly had access to massive revenues that they could direct to the
provision of state goods and the resulting improvement in quality of life. However, by
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1975 oil prices had stabilized but government expenditure continued covering the deficit
through credit provided to the burgeoning oil nation. As such the closing of the frontier
was delayed for some time. Between 1972 and 1978 government expenditure grew from
a little over 13 billion sucres (500 million USD) to more than 86.6 billion sucres (3.4
billion USD). Initially, this was mainly funded through oil export revenues, however, the
share of debt funding increased as the decade progressed and the price of oil remained
virtually stable between 1974 and 1979. To keep spending pace with the rising inflation
the government turned increasingly to borrowing. Between 1971 and 1976 Ecuadorian
external debt grew by 160% from 260.8 million USD to 693 million USD, by 1980 it
would balloon to 4.65 billion USD growing annually at an average of 60%184. Overall,
between 1971 and 1981 public foreign debt rose from 9% of GDP to 20.2% of GDP,
similarly total foreign debt -including publicly guaranteed foreign private debt- rose from
17.7% of GDP in 1972 to 35.3% in 1981185. This of course resulted in a serious current
accounts deficit and put downward pressure on the sucre’s exchange rate at the black
market even as it remained fixed at 25 sucres to the dollar officially. As such the
military’s decision to hold an election in 1978 when the inflation rate caught up with and
surpassed the growth rate was not surprising.
Jaime Roldos Aguilera won a plurality in the 1978 election and a wide majority in
the 1979 runoff election. Roldos’ rise was directly fueled by his mentor Assad Bucaram the Guayaquil native was a renowned populist, anti-communist yet anti-oligarchical-,
since Bucaram could not run, his party nominated his protege Roldos. Roldos’ campaign
saw him unite the various fractured parties behind the leadership of Bucaram’s
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Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP). Promising both to curb state spending, while
raising the minimum wage, improving the provisioning of services, and to explore means
to better reform the political system. To balance his Pacific credentials he chose the
Andean politician Osvaldo Hurtado as his running mate186. As he ascended to the
presidency the Iranian revolution and subsequent Gulf war sent oil prices doubling in one
year. Since oil accounted for roughly half of Ecuador’s exports at the time, the second
windfall saved Roldos from having to make any serious sacrifices especially as he failed
to translate his popular appeal into a political will for reform. In 1981 after a short
conflict with Peru -which Ecuador lost- bolstered his popularity, he died in a plane crash
on May 24th187. Hurtado however was not as lucky as Roldos.

Market Shock: The Original Bailout
Ecuador’s oil-fueled economy allowed the country to sustain excessive current
account deficits as long as oil prices remained high. The oil boom had fuelled the
economy as a direct source of revenue for the government, a reason for increased foreign
credit availability, and an engine of public spending that hoped to properly industrialize
the country. As well as a massive source of inequality, corruption, and political struggle
over how to control the oil rents. Inequality in rentier economies can be seen as a simple
failure of democratic function, as a functioning democratic society would see rents
distributed equally. As such with the dictatorship and following fractious and barely
functioning democracy, distribution of rents in Ecuador was patently unfair. While
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petroleum accounted for 10% of GDP, it accounted for an average of half Ecuador’s
exports but was directly linked to less than 1% of the working population188. This meant
that petroleum proceeds and the concomitant services and banking operations became
sources of political patronage as well as access to foreign currency.

The 1982 El Niño season was particularly destructive in Ecuador, triggering an
outbreak of malaria and destroying crops across the country. Shortly after, the oil glut
arrives and oil prices start to recede. The absence of any substantial oil savings funds
meant that the government had no way to cushion the blow to current accounts. This led
the government to rely more on seigniorage to finance the deficit, spurring inflation. The
1982 Mexican default triggered an effective freeze on new loans to Latin America189. The
concomitant global recession meant that money markets were drying up just as Ecuador’s
budget deficit was increasing, and Hurtado, with all his sources of foreign currency
shrinking, finally had to act. In May 1982 he moved to devalue the sucre by 25%, as well
as increasing bank interest rates, increasing the prices of publicly provided goods and
services, and eliminating subsidies and introducing budget cuts190. The devaluation
necessarily worsened the problem of rising external debt, both public and private. Shortly
after the banking sector started asking for relief as the devaluation made their borrowing
spree much more costly; threatening a collapse of the banking system, the government of
Hurtado finally extended relief.
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The relief came in the form of the “Sucretization” in the context of an IMF
program. In 1983, it was agreed that the Ecuadorian government would assume 1.5
billion USD of private foreign debt -amounting to 11% of GDP-, in exchange for debt
denominated in sucres; leaving little more than 200 million USD in private foreign debt
by 1984. This offloading of private debt onto the public balance sheet especially in the
context of another round of devaluation in March 1983 constituted not only a bailout but
a massive transfer of wealth to the banking sector. The rampant inflation accompanying
the devaluation wiped out possible gains from labor price competition191. The worsening
crisis saw the GDP contract in 1983 by 3.3%. In 1984 Leon Febres Cordero a
conservative neoliberal was elected by a very narrow margin while the unpopular
Hurtado did not stand for election192.
Cordero’s reign was characterized by aggressive neoliberalism, he liberalized the
economy, deregulated the banking sector, removed import taxes as well as price controls,
and also embarked on a privatization campaign that lagged quickly as popular opposition
to him mounted193. Upon taking office he also extended the time limit for private
businesses to repay their “Sucretiziation” obligation to the Central Bank of Ecuador
(CBE) by seven additional years. In 1986 as the first Gulf war neared its end, oil prices
collapsed to levels not seen in over a decade with oil revenue as a percentage of GDP
reduced by more than half, from 12.5% in 1985 to 6.5% in 1986 triggering another crisis
and contraction in the Ecuadorian economy194. The worsening conditions and general
distrust of the political system as it stands led the indigenous movements of the Coast,
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Sierra, and the Amazon to coalesce into the “Confederación de las Nacionalidades
Indígenas del Ecuador'' (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador—
CONAIE). The newly minted confederation between indigenous people consciously
chose to avoid political processes as they sought to avoid the baffles to popular action
that they form195. In January of 1987, debt service to foreign banks was interrupted and
the government went into arrears, in March an earthquake damaged the SOTE pipeline,
and exports were stopped for five months, during which the state’s foreign reserves ran
dry and the government resorted to successive mini devaluations by mid-1987 as social
unrest continued to mount196.
Much like Hurtado, Cordero ended his term deeply unpopular, opting not to run;
he was succeeded by Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, a social democrat who capitalized on the
rising discontent and ran against the neoliberal reforms197. Borja’s hands were tied
however, even as oil prices started to slowly recover, his government remained in
arrears198. Large contraction in the economy, as well as negative international reserves
and fiscal deficits mounting, left Cordero constrained. Forcing him to implement an
emergency austerity program that saw spending cuts, increased fuel prices, reopening the
economy, suspension of net lending from the CBE to the state government, consolidated
tariff schedules, and tax reform that included introducing the VAT199. Unpopular as these
reforms were with Cordero, and his supporters who specifically voted for an antineoliberal candidate, they were deemed necessary to access IMF funds as due to the
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Mexican crisis and accumulating arrears, Ecuador lost access to international money
markets and could only resort to multilateral institutions or private lending. Even though
shortly after his rise to power he signed an agreement with CONAIE to establish a
National Directorate of Bilingual Intercultural Education. His inability to deliver any
significant reforms and heel turn on austerity negatively affected his credibility, and in
1990, CONAIE helped organize the indigenous uprising against Borja and neoliberal
reforms. They negotiated with the government over a set of demands that ranged from the
creation of a plurinational state to the removal of the U.S. military base in Manta, to
resisting prioritizing debt servicing over public services200. While the confederation did
not succeed in its first foray, it certainly demonstrated that a new political force is
emerging.

False Shores
This, however, does not represent a turn of events. Ecuador was to become an
even more unequal society. By 1992 the rent-driven economy had fueled inequality, as
the bottom 20% of Ecuadorians earned only 2% of the national income while the top 20%
of Ecuadorians collected more than 73% of the national income201. This immense
inequality in income distribution necessarily meant a vast accumulation of capital in the
hands of the upper classes who could offshore this money in dollars and then lend the
foreign currency to the cash-strapped government. That upper class that collected these
rents and shifted their foreign loans to the public balance sheet, managed to stash more

200
201

97

Jameson, “The Indigenous Movement in Ecuador”. 65-66.
Clark, “Globalization Seen from the Margins” 20.

than 2 billion USD in offshore bank accounts thanks to banking liberalization202. As such
the capital factions had fully hedged their positions in the upcoming crisis, especially as
the arch-neoliberal Sixto Duarte Ballen won the presidency in 1992. He called for
refocusing on the primary sector and cooperated closely with the IMF203 and sought to
exploit the weak and still fractured labor movement to push forward the lagging
privatization program, even so much as threatening to privatize Petroecuador -the
primary reason Ecuador is still solvent at this point-204.
In 1994, attempting to shore up foreign reserves, Ballen liberalized the banking
sector even further allowing them even to operate in dollars and deal with Ecuadorian
through offshore branches. While this attracted Ecuadorian offshore capital through high
rates on sucre deposits, allowing the state to benefit from the sudden influx of flight
capital, it also started the official and creeping dollarization of the economy205. This
capital influx, coupled with the austerity grinding the public sector expenditure from
more than 31.4% of GDP in 1987 when the crisis started to less than 24% in 1994,
virtually wiped out the deficit for the year206. The returning capital triggered an “orgy of
credit”207 and gave the economy all the appearance of recovery. In the same year, Ballen
started negotiating with the IMF and creditors and later managed to reach a debt
reduction deal that would leave Ecuador owing only 6 billion USD and reduce the debt
servicing cost to finally bring the government out of arrears. In January 1995, however,
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the trend started to reverse for Ballen as another expensive -if short- war with Peru
reversed the capital flow pressuring the sucre down as the banks started to face serious
trouble. In October a large bank failed and vice president Alberto Dahik had to flee the
country as he faced corruption charges208.
The ignominious end of the Ballen administration mired in corruption and
economic crisis was succeeded by the ascent of Abdala Bucaram. Heir to the Bucaram
machine and calling on Roldos’ populist image, Bucaram ran a populist anti-austerity
campaign heralding an end to austerity, corruption, and increased investments in public
services but yet barely won a majority as the sierra and coastal elites did not warm up to
him. Bucaram’s time was short, his quick face turn once in office and rampant corruption
shorn him of what little support and legitimacy he had209. Protests roiled Ecuador as a
broad coalition of the opposition protesting the administration was bolstered by CONAIE
and their experience with civil disobedience methods. As the situation deteriorated,
Bucaram was impeached in February to stave off the civil strife and was succeeded by
Fabian Alarcon as interim president until a presidential election was held210. Alarcon’s
term saw the crisis worsen especially as the 1997 financial crisis sent shockwaves
through the global financial system while another destructive El Nino hit Ecuador. His
government lacked the mandate and seemingly the willingness to arrest the crisis, he also
called for a constitutional convention to write a new constitution in 1998. The next year
saw oil prices collapse further, and another small bank failed in March, starting in April
Ecuadorian banks witnessed runs of various severity. The new constitution went into
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effect in August establishing the legal autonomy of the CBE and setting price stability as
its sole objective, it also barred the CBE from lending to the central government except to
avoid liquidity crises211. Mere days after the new constitution went into effect, Jamil
Mahuad took over as president only to be faced with a bank failure within his first week
in office212.
In December, Mahuad convinced Congress to extend treasury cash guarantee to
all bank deposits and credit lines to shore up confidence in the banking system, and leave
the government on the hook if they fail213. Given that the deregulation of the banking
sector by Ballen led to the number of banks increasing by 57%, and financial institutions,
in general, rose by 180%, all of them poorly supervised, allowing for shady and outright
fraudulent lending practices214Mahuad's gamble was disastrously risky. The 1994 Ballenintroduced banking law had serious and obvious deficiencies especially in regards to
offshore activities supervision, it also left it with virtually no mechanism of dealing with
bank failures, resulting in cascading bank failures as the successive governments stood
helpless to intervene215. In January several smaller banks failed with the Deposit
Guarantee Agency (AGD) shouldering repaying their deposits after a deposit freeze for a
year. Meanwhile, the proportion of nonperforming dollar-denominated loans continued to
rise, first due to unmatched borrowers, and then thanks to the devaluation of the sucre
constantly inflating the dollar stock. In February, the sucre was floated to limit the
hemorrhaging of foreign reserves, within a month the sucre had lost more than 30% of its
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value, triggering another run on the banks. Even as oil prices doubled in 1999, the
banking crisis was too severe at this point for any windfall to stop it. The rising oil prices
renewed protests, and transport workers went on strike until the government agreed to
freeze domestic fuel prices216.
In August 1999, the government of Ecuador announced that it is withholding
interest on Brady bonds and asked for relief. The bonds were designed to be nearly
impossible to default on and included strict and explicit pledges not to ask for future
restructurings, Ecuador became the first to effectively default217. In September,
negotiations with the IMF for relief broke as congress failed to pass tax reforms
recommended by the IMF, as a result, the government announced that it would only
continue to service uncollateralized bonds and directed the holders of collateralized
bonds to ask for the collateral. Bondholders, however, chose to activate the cross-default
clauses which put Ecuador in default on all its external bonds, amounting to 6.5 billion
USD218. By the end of 1999, the Ecuadorian banking system had fully collapsed. More
than 60% of the entire commercial banking sector had fallen to government hands
through the AGD, as banks failed, their clients regained access to their deposits after a
time freeze, then proceeded to withdraw their deposits fully from the collapsing banking
system -and offshoring it if possible- accelerating its collapse. The rolling bank crises
paralyzed the government and drained its resources. The government had to suspend pay
for some government employees, most affected among which were the teachers who
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went on strike, the GDP contracted by 7.3%, urban unemployment doubled, and the
government managed to achieve a small primary surplus219.
Simply put, all of Ecuador had to pay for the sins of its bankers. Ecuador had
virtually entered a permanent state of civil unrest. The collapsing economy, the unpopular
government, and the unpopular political system as a whole saw the country mobilize, and
CONAIE’s choice to remain independent of the political system allowed it to be in the
center of coalescing opposition to Mahuad’s policies. After Mahuad announced
dollarization in January 2000, the population revolted. The dollarization policy would
amount to another transfer of wealth to the upper classes who held dollars, while the
majority of Ecuadorians would lose even more than they already did. As Ecuadorians
continued to pour into the capital, the army refused to disperse them and a national
salvation junta was announced headed by Antonio Vargas of CONAIE, colonel Lucio
Guiterrez, and judge Carlos Solorzano220. The junta lasted all of a day before fears of
sanctions and international pressure forced them to dissolve and institute Gustavo Noboa,
Mahuad’s vice president to finish his term221.

Political Crisis:
Even though dollarization was the straw that broke the camel’s back for Mahuad’s
administration as it was deeply unpopular with the sweeping majority of Ecuadorians,
full dollarization was the logical conclusion of the slate of reforms implemented over the
past two decades, often in opposition to popular will and campaign promises. The
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banking class, which started essentially as an outgrowth and an auxiliary of commercial
capital in the colony, had been steadily feeding on the amassed surplus of commodity
booms. The “Sucretization” was by all accounts a massive transfer of wealth to private
firms and banks that had racked debts beyond their ability to realistically service. This
drive was enabled by lax financial regulation and political connections and outright
corruption. The “Sucretization” itself was a product of the scale of financial malpractice
of Ecuadorian bankers, who claimed that they are effectively too big to fail. The massive
exposure to foreign debt in the private sector made a full economic collapse a possibility
in the event of mass defaults. Exposure alone however does not account for the ensuing
transfer of wealth, but “moral hazard” does222. That is corruption. The intimately close
relationship between business and politics practically meant that a lot of the politicians in
charge were bailing out themselves, their private firms, or their banks. Simply, the
capital-owning class bailed out itself and skimmed a bit off the top.
Interestingly enough, shortly after the “Sucretization” as the Mexican crisis saw
foreign creditors desert the region, newly under-leveraged private lenders would become
the main source of foreign borrowing along with multilateral institutions as the
government attempted to service the newly nationalized foreign debt223. Having emerged
not only unscathed but profiting twice, financial capital had no incentives to reform its
practices leading directly to the notoriously corrupt financial sector of the 1990s.
The repeated platitude in almost every work discussing the financial crises of
Ecuador stresses in the strongest terms that the root cause of all these crises is misguided
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attempts at economic reform and weak financial regulation. However, the fact that
bankers, through cosmetic accounting practices and with minimal supervision created
two banking crises within fifteen years costing Ecuadorians billions of dollars each time
without any significant crackdown on the banking sector, speaks not only to the failure of
the system of democratic accountability but also to the absolute dominance of financial
capital in Ecuador. The IMF-sponsored banking reforms in the intervening period did not
seem to help, as strengthening regulations rarely matters if circumventing regulation is
the problem. This circumvention was far more a function of social relations, political
connection, and economic entanglements than of legal code. The fractured and usually
incohesive labor movements in Ecuador could not move to protect themselves from the
crises. They did not have the political connections, or organizational structures that could
protect their interests, as such the only means of mobilization for them was protesting.
They could bring down two presidents in quick succession, but they could not dictate the
aftermath in either case.
Financial capital, by its very function as the originator of the crisis, was alerted to
it first. The bankers in Guayaquil and Quito identified both the ideological position of the
government as well as banking deregulation as what encouraged the financial corruption
that characterized the 1990s224. Fundamentally, they understood that the conditions
allowing them to cook their books allowed everyone else in the financial sector to do the
same, which is evidenced by the extent of bank failures225. This early warning allowed
them to move to hedge their positions and lobby for their interests. Meanwhile, their
relative class cohesion -at least compared to labor- and political connections allowed
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them to do this effectively, meaning that each time, when the bill came due, someone else
would have to pay.
Hence, labor's protestations against Mahuad in January were not going to change
anything about the current crisis. Semi-dollarization was incredibly unstable and retreat
from dollarization was not possible now barring radical and mostly illegal measures.
Dollarization was also deemed a prerequisite for any IMF bailout, and Gustavo Noboa
ended up shepherding it through Congress in March of 2000 as the Fundamental
Economic Transformation Law among other neoliberal reforms, expanding privatizations
and liberalizing the labor market226. Labor and indigenous movements went on to collect
more than a million signatures for a referendum on dollarization before it was legally
triggered in September. Noboa expressed that he was willing to improve infrastructure
and public expenditure, but that dollarization was a fait accompli227.
Within a month of the dollarization law, the IMF reached a 304 million USD
standby agreement with Ecuador and immediately disbursed the first of six tranches. This
was followed in May by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) releasing several
delayed tranches from sectoral adjustment loans in 1994. In June, the IMF released its
second tranche and the World Bank’s turn came to supply a 150 million USD structural
adjustment loan with comprehensive conditionalities228. In July a debt reduction deal
was reached under the auspices of the IMF, whereby bondholders were offered to
exchange their Brady bonds and Eurobonds for uncollateralized bonds due in 2030 with
an initially low-interest rate, or a high-interest bonds maturing in 2012 if they accept a
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35% cut on the principal. In total this amounted to a 40% write-off on the principal on
these bonds. The new bonds however were even more fortified than Brady bonds hoping
to make a third restructuring or discussion of these bonds impossible229.
From then on Noboa does not differ much from his predecessors, he institutes
more neoliberal reforms in September to access the third IMF tranche which triggers
protests by CONAIE and various labor and opposition groups. In December, he
announced another round of structural adjustment reforms which renewed the protests
forcing him to cave. The rest of Noboa’s term is spent attempting to fulfill
conditionalities and access tranches. Sometimes he would succeed, sometimes he would
fail230. Overall, the shocking passage of dollarization mobilized the Ecuadorian people to
a degree where they forced their will on the government with some regularity. The fact
that CONAIE, which opted to remain outside of the political system, was a major force
enforcing this new accountability made perfect sense. The fundamental problem with
electoral democracies lies in how little control the electorate has on an official after their
election. This lack of direct and ongoing accountability is arguably a part and parcel of
the design of modern executives. Consequently, the only way to counter that fundamental
flaw was to go outside of the political structures as they are imposed.
The overall desolation of the crisis would see more than half a million
Ecuadorians immigrate within two years, their remittances will help bolster the nation’s
current account for the coming years as the crisis subsides231. Lucio Guitterez, the former
colonel in the national salvation junta started running for president after his release from
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prison, building a wide coalition with a significant part of CONAIE and the associated
Pachakutik Movement232, teacher unions, and various anti-neoliberal political forces. He
heavily benefited from comparisons to Hugo Chavez. However, after coming to power he
chose indigenous people to head the ministries of agriculture and foreign affairs and then
proceeded to rule as a standard neoliberal233.
In March, Guiterrez signed another standby agreement with the IMF, precipitating
a break in his coalition as the indigenous movements started to peel off. By July, any
dialogue about restoring CONAIE support was over and disappointment set among the
movement as they felt betrayed by Guiterrez234. As a result of his talks with the IMF, they
agreed that if he manages to denationalize the “crown jewel” fields in Oriente, the IMF
can sponsor another round of debt reduction for beleaguered Ecuador. With a long history
of staving off privatization attempts, the Petroecuador workers started a slow down in
June and escalated in August to massive strikes and protests after the administration fired
organizing workers. The minister of energy even requested militarizing Petroecuador
after more than half the workforce refused to show up. Eventually, Guitterez accepted his
defeat but his support was damaged greatly among most of his former supporters235.
As Guittirez attempted to pass more reforms, his popularity waned and opposition
to him grew at a dangerous rate. From 2004 onward, massive protests swept the country
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over corruption and austerity even as CONAIE was conspicuously absent, humiliated by
the betrayal and attempting to reunite and reorient the movement236. By April 2005,
Guitterez was removed by Congress, bowing to the protests to be succeeded by his vice
president Alfredo Palacio, a former technocratic minister of health. Palacio spoke of the
need to rewrite the 1998 constitution and brought his economic advisor, Rafael Correa, as
Minister of Economy and Finance. Both Correa and Palacio were brought along in
Guitterez’s anti-neoliberal phase, Correa, for example, was charged with looking at the
feasibility and setup of universal healthcare. They attempted to reappropriate funds
dedicated to buybacks stipulated by the 2000 debt restructuring deal to pay for healthcare
but failed to pass the measure237.
Guitterez was the third president to run on an explicitly anti-neoliberal platform
and the second to be removed in an uprising. While Borja's opposition to neoliberalism
was a more coherent -and ideological- opposition, he became president in the aftermath
of compounding crises, and as such his concessions were opposed but on some level
understood. Bucaram and Guitterez however were another case. Both of them populists;
they seemed to have espoused anti-neoliberal stances mostly for political purposes.
Bucaram’s stunningly quick turn -not to mention his razor-thin majority- saw his political
fortunes plummet immediately. Guitterez’s was slower, which was arguably a function of
his coalition taking the time to unravel around him and coalesce to oppose and depose
him. Eventually, both Bucaram and Guitterez seemed to concede too much, too early, and
without enough hesitation. But more importantly, their hand was not forced as Borja’s
has been, and as such their treachery appeared entirely elective.
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After Guitterez’s removal, Correa moved quickly, and in June managed to
reappropriate the buyback fund’s 1.1 billion dollars and directed it into a new fund for
social spending and healthcare. This showed the citizens’ that his opposition is not just
rhetorical and that it is not just a ploy. It also deeply alienated the World Bank and IMF
whose relationship with Correa was already strained238. By July the World Bank let
Correa know that 100 million dollars disbursement will not be made, effectively forcing
his resignation within a month. This sent Correa’s popularity and credibility even higher.
He instantaneously became a presidential prospect even as he would struggle to form a
coalition, particularly with an indigenous movement now cynical of alliances after
Guitterez’s Betrayal239.
Over 2006, Correa started to campaign on an anti-austerity, anti-debt, and
generally anti-neoliberal platform. He created the PAIS Alliance in cooperation with
other civic leaders ranging from traditional left intellectuals, new left activists, labor, and
indigenous organizers to be the platform for his candidacy. Correa railed against
privatization and promised to convene a constituent assembly as well as to audit public
debt240. In the runoff, Correa faced frontrunner Alvaro Noboa, the banana billionaire,
successfully convincing the electorate of his program, and most importantly his sincerity
helped Correa clinch the victory. On his first day in office, he called for a referendum on
convening a constituent assembly241.
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Resolution:
In his inaugural address, Correa railed against a culture of issuing debt abroad that
has left the country grossly over-indebted. He also appointed Ricardo Patino Aroca -a
leftist economist, debt activist, and member of PAIS- to the finance ministry, who
intimated that Ecuador might delay an interest payment that sent Ecuadorian bonds
plummeting in the secondary market. Ecuador ended up making the payment in time, and
Patino was accused of deliberately manipulating the bond market242. Meanwhile, the lack
of organized party support in the congress allowed it to become an early center of
opposition, especially to the referendum scheduled for March, contesting Correa’s
mandate to call for it. Things came to a boil in March, as the majority of the congress
continued to oppose the referendum, and while all three previous presidents’
administrations ended in moments like these, Correa’s support was much more solid.
Whether the pouring protests in favor of Correa, and his sheer popularity might have
swung the vote of the electoral commission or not, cannot be determined, but in either
case, they voted to impeach the 57 members of parliament -out of 100- that obstructed the
referendum. The referendum was held in April and more than 80% voted in favor of a
new constituent assembly243.
As rumors continued to circle Patino, he finally had to quit the ministry, during
his tenure, he settled Ecuador's debt with the IMF and informed them that their presence
in Ecuador will no longer be needed. He would not be gone from the scene, however, as
Correa delivered on another promise by creating the Integral Auditing Commission for
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the Public Credit (CAIC) and appointed him to lead it244. CAIC’s directive was to assess
the "legitimacy, legality, transparency, quality, efficacy and efficiency" of public debt
issued between 1976 and 2006, CAIC was given a year to accomplish this herculean task.
By continuing to deliver on his promises Correa managed to maintain public support and
in September of that year PAIS -now contesting elections- gained 80 out of 130 seats245.
The new constitutional assembly mollified indigenous anger and protests as it
promised more recognition and rights. Wide agreement with Correa’s economic policies
and the new assembly’s progressive outlook made for a calm third congress for CONAIE
in January 2008 that focused on the constitutional demand for a plurinational state. In
April, the assembly accepted CONAIE’s position and voted to make Quichua and Shuar
official languages246. The Assembly also passed a series of popular measures such as the
end of the military cooperation agreement with the U.S.A that allowed it to occupy the
Manta airbase, the suspension of free trade agreement negotiations with the U.S.A., as
well as a ban on labor outsourcing, and measures providing for the confiscation of
property of bankers involved in the bankruptcy of the financial system247.
On the economic front, capital flight tax imposed a year earlier at 0.5% was raised
to 1% aiming to stem capital flight. Calls within the constitutional assembly to put the
CBE under executive control, and tighten regulations on the banking sector aiming to
wean it off a fees model of profit won the day248. Correa’s policies since his election
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centered on improving the provisioning of public services. He doubled poverty assistance
programs funding, doubled housing loan credit available, and cut electricity prices for the
poor. This created valuable trust and support that he needed as he proceeded to seize the
Isaias group conglomerate to recover part of the state’s losses due to the failure of
Filanbanco during the banking crisis249. In September, the new constitution focusing on
the state’s redistributive role, re-establishment of state control over the CBE, regulation
of the banking sector, and plurinationality passed by 63% of the vote, despite fierce
opposition from the business class, catholic establishment, and mass media250. In regards
to economic policy, Article 271 granted autonomous municipal governments a minimum
of 15% of permanent revenue and 5% of non-permanent revenue of the central
government251. Article 290 deals extensively with borrowing, outright forbidding private
borrowing and compound interest and stipulates that public borrowing is to be used only
as a last resort, and on the condition, it does not affect sovereignty, the rights of people,
and nature. It also provides a legal basis for renegotiation and revocation of unlawful
debts, as well as the seizure of assets of the guilty party without a statute of limitations252.
The CAIC report was delayed for months due to the enormity of the task and was
finally delivered in November of 2008. The report included many accusations of
irregularity, negligence of responsibility, as well as accusing the federal reserve of
illegally hiking interest rates. Most importantly, however, it gave Correa the cover to
order skipping a 31 million dollars coupon repayment on the 2012 bonds. On December
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12th, a moratorium was declared on the 2012 bonds as they were deemed “immoral”,”
illegal”, and “illegitimate”. Three days later, a 30.5 million repayment on 2005 bonds issued shortly after he was forced out by the IMF- was also put on hold. Correa assured
that all obligations to bilateral and multilateral creditors will be met notwithstanding the
CAIC report. In January of 2009, shortly before the grace on the 2005 bonds ran out,
Ecuador repaid it253.
In February 2009, 130 million dollars interest payment on 2030 bonds were
missed, reinforcing the targeted character of the default and specifying that it is the bonds
restructured in the 2000 restructuring deal that are put on a moratorium. On April 20th,
the government stated that its objection to the bonds is that the haircut was not as deep as
it should have been, and offered a buyback at 70% haircut, by May 15th more than 91%
of holders took the offer. Holdouts and some Italian investors were given another option
to accept a 65% haircut raising the buyback rate to more than 95%, allowing the
government to retire more than 3 billion dollars in debt for just 900 million dollars254.
Correa had correctly realized that debt as a unifying issue can help meld his
Citizen’s Revolution and rally Ecuadorians to a common cause. The interweaving of the
political and economic was often disregarded by his predecessors to their great peril.
Mobilizing both for the constitution and default at the same time not only was an
exhausting task but was fundamentally the only way to carry out either of them. A
government without the support of the people cannot withstand the possible costs of
default, and the government will not have the support of the people unless it carries
economic reforms that upset international creditors. The solution to this self-feeding
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cycle is to address it on both fronts at the same time to prevent the system from
reconstituting itself. Additionally, while some have taken to criticizing Correa, and Patino
among others for alleged manipulation of the market or what was framed as intimidation
of bondholders, they fail to account for the fact that such behaviors have been perfectly
acceptable by financial institutions in Ecuador’s case among others. They simply
exploited an already declining market to enact a political will through market
mechanisms, instead of seeking to impose that will through political means on the market
-a proposition that often fails. The repeated failures of national coalitions in withstanding
the debt crisis onslaught effectively meant that by the time Correa’s coalition is formed, it
is almost entirely composed of the various labor and leftist organizations, as national
capital was not only responsible for the crisis but unwilling to bear any costs of a future
confrontation with international capital. This is partly due to the massive offshoring of
capital, which meant that distinctions between Ecuadorian capital and international
capital were fading. As such, this new bloc had to politically and legally subdue national
capital while it faced international capital in default
Ecuador’s highly selective default was not premised on Ecuador's inability to pay
as most defaults are, but rather it was anchored in the unfairness of the debt. This allowed
Ecuador to splinter the capital alliance, especially in the context of the global financial
crisis as no one was willing to give up revenue streams just to attempt to trigger a crossdefault. More importantly, the fact that default was an act of will instead of the last resort
meant that Ecuador was fully prepared to meet the challenges of default. The global
financial crisis and improving foreign reserves meant that Ecuador could withstand
reduced capital markets accessibility. The new constitution not only provided a legal
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basis for the default and safeguards against future crises but also brought back the central
bank under state control. The new constitution also functioned to consolidate Correa’s
relatively recent and incohesive coalition, as it unified the various labor factions into one
project that encompassed debt relief, sovereignty, environmental protection, and
redistribution of wealth. This popular backing meant that the government had the internal
front secured in case of a prolonged default. Correctly articulating debt as the common
thread in all of these issues, and that the problem of debt is not an economic issue to be
addressed technocratically, but a political issue of struggle and mobilization greatly aided
this effort. Twinned together, the constitution and default can be understood as the
political and economic foundations of an attempt at a new historic bloc in Ecuador that
reflects the new reality of the polity.
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Perhaps it is difficult to write any narrative of a debt crisis without it sounding a
bit conspiratorial. The unpredictability of the crises coupled with rather clear outcomes in
terms of winners and losers makes conspiracy a great narrative to fill the gap. However,
the appearance of conspiracy often does not correlate to the appearance of conspirators.
This conspiracy without conspirators is nothing more than the visage of exploitable
structural dysfunction255.

Economic Dysfunction:
This structural dysfunction starts from the moment debt is accrued. While
sovereign debt was originally a function of covering temporary deficits, it has
increasingly become a central feature of state financing. This rise in debt is accounted for
by Streeck’s double examination of debts and taxes as inverse corollaries. The failure of
neoliberalism to generate the economic growth it promised and ensuing tax cuts to
simulate the effects of rising incomes necessitated higher debt stocks. This entailed that
the state would continue financing its needs at capital markets sufferance, as capital’s
relationship with the state moves from taxpayer to stockholder; its ability to influence
discourse and decisions increases beyond the need to generate public support. This
repositioning of capital as accounted by Streeck is only possible so long as this process is
not discussed in such terms256.
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The rise of econometrics and neoliberalism together in the 1970s and 1980s was
no coincidence, but rather a necessity. Neoliberalism’s central thesis that is subjugating
the political to the economic would not have been possible without depoliticizing
economics and rooting it in a higher truth. As such, neoliberal economics focused on
mathematical modeling as a foundation of economics as “hard” science. This claim that
economics is a hard science is perhaps the only deliberate act of deception in this
“conspiracy without conspirators” as it formed the ideological bedrock for neoclassical
economics -and its heir in neoliberal economics- as it aimed to move the economy from
the democratic social sciences to the authoritative natural sciences. This pretense is kept
through byzantine mathematical models that are inscrutable to the lay citizen, finishing
the transformation of economists into the high priests of capitalism. As the economic
management of the polity is removed from democratic political control and into the
abjured realm of economic forecasting, decisions regarding the economy are discussed in
natural and mechanical terms instead of social or political terms. Within the context of
access to easy credit, as lower taxes liberated more surpluses for the financial markets,
this meant maximizing -ostensibly sustainable- borrowing to maximize investments
instead of using debt as a bridge funding mechanism. This necessarily meant higher
exposure to financial and debt crises as sustained high levels of debt meant that debt
sustainability in the event of adverse shocks is highly unlikely.

Political Dysfunction:
While debt is an economic representation in a fundamentally unequal power
dynamic. International debt heightens this dynamic. While local capital can accrue
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disproportionate power within the local historic bloc as a stockholder through sovereign
debt, it is still fundamentally tied to this polity. That is, while capital has disproportionate
economic power, through democratic control over state power or threats to it, labor can
still form a check on its power. However, in the case of international debt, this possibility
of democratic amelioration of debt conditions is lessened as the lender is solely bound to
the polity through the debt obligation and nothing else. They can also call on their states,
international institutions and mobilize internationally to oppose such popular checks on
capital power.
The onset of an international debt crisis whether due to economic mismanagement
or unforeseen shocks means that an economic system will be effectively starved of
capital until the crisis abates. This means that at the onset of the crisis, capital factions both national and international- start at an advantage in any negotiation as to how to
apportion the cost of the crisis. Unopposed, a capital alliance will spring out of
ideological coherence and practical expediency and impose the burden on the labor
faction. The fact that neoliberal reforms significantly weaken labor allows for that
process to happen rather quickly. Heightening the appearance of a conspiracy, the
suddenness of the crisis coupled with its exploitation by some at the expense of others
makes a routine failure of a dysfunctional system appear a sinister machination and a well
laid out trap. The quick and austerity-laden solutions to the Greek debt crises in 2010 and
2012 and the Ecuadorian debt crisis of 1982 were hammered out quickly and relatively
free of public interference producing that distinct feeling of conspiracy.
As the objectives of international capital and local labor are relatively stable,
secured returns for the first and avoiding austerity for the latter, at the onset of the crisis it
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is only the national capital’s objectives that are the independent variable. This variable is
determined by which capital faction is dominant in that polity. Industrial capital may be
more amenable to an accommodation with labor as it depends on it for the realization of
value and hence has a lower threshold for tolerating public unrest. Financial capital on
the other hand can tolerate much more public unrest. The ever more complex financial
architecture means that financial capital can continue realizing value largely
independently of local labor input, as the governing ideology dictates the liberation of
central banks from political control and devotes them to the stability of financial markets.
Financial capital can rest easy knowing that whatever losses it may incur a bailout can be
arranged, while the freedom of movement of capital allows it to escape quickly if the
situation deteriorates. This allows it to withstand social unrest to a higher degree while at
the same time making it even more entangled in the mass of international capital markets.
As such financial capital’s dependence on access to international capital markets makes it
particularly poised for a capital alliance.
This in turn determines labor’s strategy, as while it can ally with industrial capital,
it has to subdue financial capital. In fact, in the cases surveyed, labor’s success in
subduing financial capital was the determining factor for the outcome of the crisis. The
Ecuadorian case saw several attempts to form a national alliance from Borja, to Bucaram
and Guitterez. Several attempts were pursued but always failed due to the dominance of
the fairly coherent financial cartel and its ever-increasing power since financial
deregulation. The success of Correa’s attempt is anchored in a holistic approach that
attempted to address the various structural dysfunctions inborn of neoliberalism
simultaneously. While debt levels in Correa’s term were near record lows since the
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1980s, he correctly used debt as a rallying issue and the tentpole of a full anti-neoliberal
rollback that focused on eliminating the structural issues that allowed the former crises to
take place. These included reclaiming state control over the central bank, setting
constitutional requirements for private and foreign borrowing, and imposing tight
regulation on the financial institutions. Correa had previously declared that the bonds
were unfair and should be defaulted on even before he became a political figure.
However, he waited to act until the new constitution was approved as only by then he
would have the entire arsenal of tools with which to impose democratic political control
over capital. He also waited for opportune macroeconomic conditions as he prepared to
default. A tight borrowing market due to the global financial crisis meant lenders would
prefer to recoup some of their money through accepting haircuts rather than losing it all
to default, while Ecuador’s high foreign reserves cushioned the temporary loss of access
to financial markets.
In the Greek case, Varoufakis -another economist- was fully aware that his lack of
a central bank and the concomitant lack of sovereign political control over financial
markets was the biggest liability. Not only was the bank independent of any democratic
control by Greek labor, but it was also functionally a branch of the ECB, an auxiliary of
European capital. As such, Greek labor could not entice capital into an alliance nor
coerce it into one, dooming its attempt to failure. Varoufakis’ attempt to liquidate the
banks was not only an ingenious idea to alleviate the debt crisis but also a last-ditch
attempt to finally end Greek financial capital’s role as a corrupt middleman and replace it
with direct German capital. Greece’s existence within the EU puts it at a structural
disadvantage as European capital is far more integrated than European labor. Nestled
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within EU structures, the Syriza government was born in a hostile environment, and even
with a popular mandate greater than Correa’s could not enforce that popular will.
Varoufakis’ correctly understood that his proposals would not make him allies in the
ranks of Greek capital and hence thought to bypass it completely by offering it to German
capital as recompense for the debts. However, he perhaps underestimated how valuable
Greek capital is ideologically as an absorbent of the crisis. Even as German and French
banks were hit by the crisis, it was Greek bankers' failure that meant that everyone could
lay the blame at their feet. If Greek capital is to be liquidated, a significant veil would
break, and the increasing friction between German capital and Greek labor could be
ideologically more poisonous to the EU than a protracted Greek crisis.
More importantly, the Greek case highlights how international debt is permitted to
override popular will, not just manifested in sustained protests but also a clear majority in
a referendum that opposed the bailout. The overriding of the referendum vote was not an
aberration but policy. According to Varoufakis, Schäuble the German finance minister
said as much: “Elections cannot be allowed to change economic policy.”257
In Puerto Rico, the lack of sovereignty created an obvious disconnect between the
reality of popular will on the island and the type of agreements being reached in New
York. Unlike the Citizens’ Revolution in Ecuador or Syriza in Greece, the lack of a
sovereign political authority rendered official political participation superfluous as there
was no institution to capture on the island that could end the crisis one way or another.
Popular participation mostly manifested in continuous protesting, a form very common
during Ecuador’s sclerotic period too. Lacking access to political sovereignty is bad
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enough for prospects of debt negotiations, being a close colony of the reigning global
hegemon is an unquantifiable disadvantage. For Puerto Rico, default was not a realistic
option, it is precluded by the island’s place in international politics. As such, relief from
the federal government was the only possible option.

Exploitability:
Chief to discerning whether a mechanism is intended or not, that is whether it is a
feature or a bug is to ascertain any benefits it has to the system. While debt crises are
disastrous events that seem to lay waste to entire economies in their wake, in everyone
we find some factions that managed to make gains. These gains could be monetary as
with the “Sucretization” that saw the Ecuadorian capital being bailed out at a profit, or
the Greek capital that merely got bailed out to the tune of a couple of hundred billion
Euros, or Puerto Rican capital that benefitted off the crisis both by bringing island
policies closer to its patrons on the mainland and snatching up the island’s depreciating
assets. The fact that debt crises would favor capital is no surprise since debt itself is an
expression of capital’s power to foreclose on future labor. As such, the course of least
resistance favors capital by default and until default. However, one would be hardpressed to find evidence that any of these crises were purposely engineered. It would not
be right to assume debt crises are a feature then as they fundamentally threaten the
process of capital accumulation. It would also be equally wrong to assume it is a bug, a
bug this monumental would necessitate a structural response. Such a response was
suggested by the IMF before as they proposed a structured process for sovereign defaults.
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This proposal, however, was vetoed by the United States258. Hence, it is probably more
accurate to conceive of debt crises as an “exploit”; an unintentional contradiction that
threatens the coherence of the system within which it is encoded, but -unlike a bug- can
be exploited by some for gain. As such, the debt crisis represents a break and
renegotiation of power relations established by the accrued debt. The most powerful and
organized political faction gets to exploit the crisis for political or economic gains or at
least shielding from harm. In this understanding, debt crises cease to be problems and
become exploitable opportunities since barring successful opposition debt crises can
become invaluable tools in passing unpopular measures shielded from political
opposition by the obligation of debt.
That is to say, since debt crises bring to the fore an inherent contradiction in the
system, this forcibly sheds any illusion of a monolithic system. As horizons for growth
dissipate and the situation becomes a zero-sum game, the existing ideological and
institutional superstructures' inability to resolve this contradiction erodes their hold on the
polity. This corrosion of superstructures prompts factions to conceive of their
relationships with other actors without the ameliorative mystification of state and
economic ideology, but instead in the crucible of conflicting material interests. The
delegitimized state apparatus becomes the battleground as factions attempt to control it in
order to fortify their interests and ensure they will not be exploited, and if they can,
exploit others.
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Didactic Dysfunction:
If we are to understand debt crises as “exploits”, this would also account for the
didactic dysfunction evident in the cases of this study. While Ecuador saw three debt
crises in roughly fifteen years, Greece managed three crises in roughly five years. This
stunning recurrence of debt crises in such short periods indicates a serious didactic
failure. All of these crises were invariably caused by the discretion of “moral hazard” of
the local banking sector. While in Greece, the three crisis episodes were a manifestation
of the same debt crisis, in each one the banks were bailed out. In the Ecuadorian case,
after being bailed out at a profit in the “Sucretization” the banks went back to exactly the
same lending practices causing the first one, causing two more distinct crises afterward. It
is also important not to overstate the role Dollarization played in the Ecuadorian crises.
The 1980s crisis for example, happened while the vast majority of the Ecuadorian
economy was still denominated in Sucres. The 1997 crisis occurred in a semi-dollarized
economy, thanks to Ballen’s 1994 banking liberalization laws259; and while the 2009
default occurred in a fully dollarized economy, it was not the last resort of an insolvent
state or a banking crisis but the active choice of reallocating state resources. In fact,
dollarization is arguably the result of the first two crises. The 1994 reforms that opened
the door for dollarization were formulated as a response to the crisis of the 1980s to
finally bring Ecuador out of arrears. The unstable state of semi-dollarization that resulted
contributed to the 1997 crisis, the response to which was full dollarization in 2000260. As
such, while Dollarization was a factor, it was not the determining factor. Dollarization’s
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main importance comes from the limits it imposed on the 2009 default. While it removed
the problem of currency mismatch, it cost Ecuador seigniorage revenue, the
independence of its monetary policy, and its economic sovereignty.
In each case, the bankers were bailed out, the risky behavior that caused the crisis
continued. This is due to a simple behavioral disconnect. Due to its starting advantage,
capital can often emerge out of the crisis having made gains, or at least avoided losses.
This fortification of capital positions extended by supposedly independent central banks
means that capital has no real incentive to reform itself or guard against future episodes.
This fundamental insulation of the banking sector from the consequences of crises
that they themselves created disincentivizes any reform. This insulation is not afforded to
the banking sector out of conspiratorial arrangement but rather a necessity of neoliberal
structures. The centrality of deregulated financial markets to the neoliberal project both to
recycle and redistribute wealth and reify the absorption of value chains in the periphery
by the financial centers means that an actual crash in the financial market could spell the
end of neoliberalism and the social contract it sponsors. As such, central banks
independent of political will and accountable only to capital become the safest insurance
that such a crash would not happen. These structural safeguards and baffles mean that the
default trajectory will be to favor capital unless sufficient political will is exerted to
remove these baffles and alter the trajectory. These structural barriers to improvement
and reform within a self-reproducing system can only be overcome through intervening
in the mechanisms of reproduction both ideologically and economically. That is,
simultaneously politicizing debt, rejecting the fictitious premise of separation between
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the political and economic while also mobilizing political power to regulate, negotiate,
and drawdown existing debts.

Limitations and Applicability:
While the model proved useful in analyzing the selected cases, it is still bound by
these cases’ particularities. As all cases studied occurred after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system and the rise of neoliberalism, the model’s viability before that could be
limited as some of the core underlying factors such as financial technologies, and
ideological hegemony were vastly different. While all the cases are of countries with
relatively small populations and areas, it is evident that it is not the size of the population
or country, but rather it is the integration and coherence of its economy -and hence capital
class- that is the determining factor. In Puerto Rico and Greece for example, while the
opposition railed against the Criollo bloc and the bankers respectively, a well-integrated
and cohesive capitalist class proved very resilient. In Ecuador on the other hand, despite a
relatively small area and population, the country’s bountiful geographic diversity allowed
for the emergence of regionally-specific economies and as a result regional capital
factions. In fact, it was the infighting between these regional factions that was exploited
by Correa during his rise. Whether this is a pattern that holds when applied to larger and
more diverse countries requires further research.
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